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POLICY Review

OCTOBER & NOVEMBER 2003, NO. 121, $6.00

KIM JONG IL MUST GO
HENRY S. ROWEN

ANTI-SEMITISM AND ETHNICITY IN EUROPE
JOHN ROSENTHAL

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND CHARITABLE GIVING
ARTHUR C. BROOKS

TAKING PROLIFERATION SERIOUSLY
HENRY SOKOLSKI

ALSO: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS BY
AMITAI ETZIONI, ROBERT HOWSE,
SANAM VAKIL, PARAG KHANNA,
AND BRUCE BERKOWITZ

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Kim Jong Il Must Go

By HENRY S. ROWEN

NORTH KOREA'S nuclear-weapons programs confront us with hard choices. They create a sense of urgency to make another deal with the North, but experience tells us that any new agreement will not stem the flow of crises. However we handle the immediate crisis, we will do better if we do so while having in mind an end position — something we have not done since the end of the Korean War 50 years ago. The argument here is that there should be different leadership in Pyongyang as a step towards the political unification of the peninsula.

Short of that goal, the main possibility for getting rid of the North's weapons is an agreed strategy between China and the United States. Unfortunately, there is no good evidence that this will happen.

The North's weapons pose three immediate challenges. Combined with its long-range missiles, North Korea's nuclear weapons could inflict devastation at long distances, including the United States. The threat to Japan is already

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rousing Tokyo to rearm. Worse still, the regime threatens to sell bombs to all comers, including terrorist organizations.

Kim Jong Il's game

THIS CRISIS WAS set off by the North admitting that it had a secret nuclear-weapons program in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Negotiated by the Clinton administration, the framework promised economic benefits in return for North Korea's "freezing" its nuclear program. Since breaking the agreement, the Kim Jong Il regime has loudly proclaimed that the U.S. is planning to attack and has demanded a guarantee of security from us. Perhaps seeing our campaign against Iraq has persuaded Kim that he's next. But it seems more likely that he has a different and overriding perspective.

It is to gain enough resources to stay in power. The system his father, Kim Il Sung, perfected combines extreme nationalism, severe internal repression, and a Stalinist economy. The economy's dysfunctions have led to the deaths of upwards of a million people in the past decade. Kim Jong Il's margin of survival comes from extortion. At its core are nuclear weapons — along with an implicit threat of collapse and resulting social chaos that would be costly to North Korea's neighbors.

The weapons program apparently started in the late 1970s and has continued despite several international commitments to stop it, each violated. An obvious reason for starting the program was to change the military balance on the peninsula. Although the North's conventional forces were then relatively stronger than they are now, the U.S. had both troops and nuclear weapons in the South. In 1992 we removed our weapons as part of a denuclearization agreement between North and South — one of several agreements violated by the North. The U.S. estimated that the North could soon make enough plutonium for some nuclear weapons — and might have done so already. The resulting confrontation led to the Agreed Framework in 1994, in which the North agreed to shut down its reactor and store the spent fuel (containing plutonium) under international inspection. We and others agreed to provide food and fuel, to normalize relations, and to build two large nuclear electric power reactors. (The American negotiators seemed to have assumed, not unreasonably in 1994, that the North's regime would be gone by the time the reactors were finished.)

If nuclear weapons were so important in the North's strategy, why did it agree to this freeze? Its principal source of aid, the Soviet Union, had disappeared in 1991. This, plus endemic mismanagement, threw the economy into a slump. Apparently the urgent need for food and fuel, the U.S. threat to attack North Korea's nuclear plants, and perhaps arm-twisting from China did it. (The Chinese did not sweeten the deal with food; they cut their supply in 1994-95.) The North also presumably knew something we have

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come to believe only since: that it had enough plutonium for a few weapons. And we now know that at some point in the 1990s it started work on a separate, enriched uranium-based weapons program, evidently with Pakistani help.[1]

North Korea claims that we reneged on our commitments under the Agreed Framework, while the Clinton administration complained about the North's behavior. In early 2001 President Bush suspended the dialogue underway at the end of the Clinton administration, but later that year he signaled a willingness to resume talks. We were still supplying food and fuel and participating in the nuclear reactor construction program when the North revealed its second nuclear program in October 2002. In case we (and the South Koreans and Japanese) hadn't gotten the message, in April of this year the North's representative told ours that North Korea had nuclear weapons and might demonstrate (i.e., test) or sell them. In July the North announced that it had completed separating plutonium from its stored fuel rods by June 30 and that weapons production had begun. In short, North Korea is a nuclear power; on its present trajectory it will become a greater one.

Kim must have been severely disappointed that the hopes engendered by Clinton's diplomacy were interrupted by the harder line taken by Bush. His government says it wants a guarantee of security from us. Paranoia can't be ruled out in that nearly hermetically sealed society, in which ignorance of the West is profound. Perhaps the implications of being called a member of the "axis of evil" rattled him — although anyone other than a paranoid would see the implausibility of the U.S. attacking without South Korean agreement, which is most unlikely to be given. As for the North starting a war, there is no good reason to regard Kim as suicidal.

The Pyongyang regime has long had an ambitious goal. Fanciful as it might seem to outsiders, it is to unify the peninsula under its control; this is the purpose that justifies the regime's rigors. The U.S. is seen as the main obstacle, and no doubt Kim and company contemplate the political gap that has opened between the United States and South Korea with satisfaction.

But today Kim Jong Il is balancing fears — perhaps of a U.S. attack but surely for his fate from continued and perhaps worsening poverty. That fear is balanced against the perceived danger of opening the economy — with the latter one dominating. Since his economy can't produce many exports and with serious economic liberalization seen as too dangerous, what's left is outside help induced by threats. Although it has left the country desperately poor, the routine has worked.

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[1]A North Korean defector's report puts cooperation with Pakistani nuclear engineers back to 1994. Henry Sokolski, "Beyond the Agreed Framework: The DPRK's Projected Atomic Bomb Making Capabilities, 2002-09" (Nonproliferation Education Center, December 3, 2002).

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Kim is often portrayed in the West as a skillful player of a weak hand. Lately, however, his play looks erratic, as Nicholas Eberstadt has noted. He botched the creation of a special economic zone (in Sinuiju) with the Chinese and blew the opportunity to get several billion dollars soon in reparation payments from Japan by his handling of the kidnappings of Japanese citizens, and his trumpeting about nuclear weapons is helping to unify his opponents. These actions have led to cuts in the flow of fuel and food and to reports that once again the population is on the brink of famine.

He may not understand the fire with which he is playing. Building nuclear weapons puts other nations in danger, and if his having these weapons isn't enough to provoke the U.S. and perhaps the Chinese to end his rule, the prospect of North Korean fissionable material coming into the hands of terrorists should do it.

The mess in the North

This is a strikingly poor country for one populated by disciplined and well-educated Koreans. The ending of Russian aid and a cut in Chinese subsidies after 1990 contributed to economic output and foreign trade declining by about one-third and to a food supply deficit of over one million tons a year. Food conditions became disastrous in 1994 and 1995. The authorities diverted food to the army, party cadres, and workers in key industries, leaving the rest to fend for themselves. Probably upwards of a million people (around 4 percent of the population) died.

Agriculture is still collectivized 25 years after the Chinese started to abandon this mode of production. A measure of its condition was that family garden plots (limited to 120 square yards per family) yielded one-third of all agricultural output in 1997.[2] More important in that highly industrialized economy is the sorry state of industry.[3] Goods are shoddy and scarce. Many factories lie idle and productivity is low. Poverty is overwhelming. Per capita GDP seems to be about $700, for a national total of around $13 billion to $15 billion. The regime's core supporters get a large share of the country's meager supply of goods (partly through access to hard currency), a supply that might now be on the verge of inadequacy even for the elite. The military has long absorbed about one-fourth of the total, an extraordinary share for an impoverished country. Allowing for the sustenance of other parts of the

[2]Nam Sung-wook, "Feeding the People: Possible Agricultural Normalization in North Korea," *East Asian Review* (Autumn 2002).

[3]Marcus Noland (in *Avoiding the Apocalypse*, Institute for International Economics, 2000) makes the point that the failure is (even) more one of industrial than agricultural production. Had the North been able to produce farm equipment, fertilizers, and goods for export, food would have been forthcoming.

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core, perhaps $7 billion to $9 billion is left for the remaining 21 million people, around $300-$400 per year per person, an amount available for such little investment as occurs as well as personal consumption. The World Food Program estimates that 57 percent of the population is malnourished, including 45 percent of children under the age of five.[4] No wonder people try to flee.

Cash from exports and goods in kind from outside provide the crucial margin for the regime's survival. Until recently, these probably ran about $2 billion per year. They have come from six main sources: exports of raw materials, the export of weapons and drugs, gifts from Koreans in Japan, fuel oil supplied under the 1994 Agreed Framework, other support from China and South Korea (for example, via the Mount Kumgang project for South Korean tourists), and gifts of food from many countries. There have also been secret payments from the South. According to the public prosecutor, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung paid Kim Jong Il $100 million as the ticket price for the June 2000 summit meeting in Pyongyang. The Hyundai Corporation paid an additional $350 million, supposedly for business purposes. Today, most if not all of these sources are diminished, leaving the regime in even more difficulty than usual.

Kim is often portrayed in the West as a skillful player of a weak hand.

Kim Dae Jung may have seen his Sunshine Policy of payments to the North as encouraging economic reform, but they had the opposite effect: Money supplied without conditions weakens the incentive to change. Such gifts don't solve economic problems; they only leave the country in a precarious state that causes it repeatedly to go to the brink.

The economy would benefit greatly if the million-man army were to be scaled way back. The recent statement by Pyongyang that its nuclear weapons enable it to shrink its huge army has a logic. But this is North Korea, where the army is at the core of the regime, and its ability to threaten Seoul is one of its two main assets, the other being nuclear weapons. It is hard to imagine unilateral cutbacks if there is an opportunity to get paid for cutting back. Even then, one doubts that any such agreement would long be honored.

The survival of this island of poverty and obscurantism in one of the world's most prosperous and dynamic regions is a tribute to the sturdiness of the Korean people, to the power of *juche* (its ideology of self-reliant ultranationalism), and to totalitarian controls. Collapse of Soviet rule and the

[4]Human Rights Watch, "The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People's Republic of China" (November 2002).

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fate of the Ceaucescus in Romania supply nightmares to the North's rulers. More ambiguous is the model of China. The Chinese Communist Party's great economic success must have appeal, but after Kim returned from China in 2000, where the splendid results of its liberalization were on display, North Korean television described China's "opening" as a "Trojan horse tasked with destabilizing socialism."[5] As Marcus Noland has noted, Kim does not want to risk being "destabilized."[6]

Nonetheless, some liberalizing steps have been taken, including creating free trade zones (Rajin-Sonbong and Sinuiju — both bungled) and allowing farmers' markets. Potentially important is a recent large increase in the official price of goods (40,000-60,000 percent for grains). Given that wages are being changed differently for various groups in the society, there will be significant winners and losers from this "reform."[7]

Some market-oriented reforms notwithstanding, there is little evidence of a willingness to undertake basic ones. *Juche* is one explanation for this reluctance to liberalize, but there are others. Kim and his core supporters must perceive their tenure as being more fragile than have the Chinese leaders; hence a stronger insistence on keeping control. And their initiatives have been extraordinarily inept. Outsiders often comment on the ignorance of Northern officials about the world economy and how markets work.

Widespread expectations through the mid-1990s of an early collapse, especially after Kim Il Sung's death in 1994, have been succeeded by the belief that Kim Jong Il's rule will be limited only by his longevity — and that one of his sons might succeed him. This view arguably weighs too little the effects of life at the margin of starvation for many people, meager resources for many core supporters, and increasing knowledge of the people about the outside world. An appropriate image is that of a gambler who every year faces a significant, perhaps now increasing, chance of ruin.

The unlikelihood that Kim Jong Il will preside over a basic economic transformation, together with his nuclear brinkmanship, leads to the question of an alternative to Kim dynasty rule. Internal political relations there are obscure. Because years passed before Kim Jong Il assumed some of the trappings of power, some outsiders assumed that he was not firmly in charge. That view seems wrong. Evidently he was powerful in the last

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[5]Selig Harrison, in *Korean End Game* (Princeton University Press, 2002), quotes Hwang Chang Yop, the most senior defector from the North, as attributing to Kim Jong Il a desire for economic reforms but also a belief that an opening would reveal all of the killings, much worse than in China or Vietnam.

[6]Marcus Noland, "The Economics of National Reconciliation" (Institute for Corean-American Studies, 2000).

[7]Marcus Noland, "Famine and Reform in North Korea" (Institute for International Economics, July 2003).

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decade of his father's life, and his rule seems to have been unchallenged since then.

The two most salient institutions are the Korean Workers Party and the army. As far as one can tell (which is not very far), Kim is firmly in charge of both. The Workers Party has its functions in the spheres of ideology and population control, but it doesn't seem able to act independently. In contrast, the army does have power. It has the guns. No doubt Kim has taken pains to keep this power from being concentrated in the persons of a few generals. Nonetheless, if conditions get bad enough, members of these elites might act against Kim.

Worries often expressed about regime "collapse" assume that no political alternative to the Kim dynasty could succeed without political chaos — this in a country with nuclear weapons. That might be so but shouldn't simply be assumed. If conditions get bad enough, might someone who understands the need for basic economic change seize power in a way analogous to Park Chung Hee's takeover in South Korea or Deng Xiaoping's succession to the Gang of Four in China? Both were dictators who, by opening their countries, produced rapid growth and, as a consequence, increased personal freedoms for their peoples — and for South Korea, democracy. As Deng told George Shultz in July 1988 when asked his opinion of Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union, "He's got it backwards. He opened up the political system without a clue about the economy. The result is chaos. I did it the other way around, starting in agriculture and small businesses, where opening up worked, so now I have a demand for more of what succeeds." What about political opening? "That will come later and will start small, just as in the economy. You have to be patient but you have to get the sequence right."

The South

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S creation of a solid democracy is a great achievement. Leading the way was economic growth that became one of the wonders of the second half of the twentieth century. South Korea's recovery from the financial crisis of 1997-98 was faster than that of the other hard-hit countries in Asia. Its GDP is about 25 times that of the North, and if it tried it could easily dominate the North militarily without any American help (nuclear weapons aside). The American alliance reduces its incentive to try, however, with the result that it allocates only 2.8 percent of GDP to defense, scheduled to increase to 3.2 percent, versus the North's 25 percent share. The combined strength of the ROK and the United States means that the North would lose a conventional war — a salient observation in view of the North's hyperbolic statements that war will come if we do not give way on this or that of its demands. However, the fact that Seoul is at risk from many thousands of artillery tubes just north of the DMZ discourages any unilateral American attack.

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The nuclear weapon imbalance on the peninsula today (so it seems) reverses the pattern before 1991 when such weapons were in the South and not in the North. How stable is this situation? The Roh Moo-Hyun government's professions of opposition to the North's nuclear program has a certain pro forma character. Indeed, some South Koreans say they see the North's weapons as an asset in waiting for a future unified Korea. In any case, if the North persists with its nuclear programs the South's government will be under domestic pressure also to get them.

Another inference from the South's economic strength is that it can afford to invest amounts in the North large enough to transform its economy — albeit at a substantial cost. This economic differential is a huge asset for the South, one that has been badly managed. Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy of aiding the North has been, to say the least, controversial. Revelations about the deals financed through the Hyundai company have caused a great scandal.

To many South Koreans, the North is not a threat — it is more to be pitied than feared.

Nonetheless, "Sunshine" also has many supporters. Popular attitudes towards the North changed greatly during Kim Dae Jung's presidency, and to many people today it is not a threat — it is more to be pitied than feared. No longer do school textbooks simply condemn Kim Il Sung for attacking the South in 1950 and repressing his people; they now credit him as a fighter against Japanese colonialism. As Larry Diamond has noted, one sign of the South's soft approach to the North is a refugee's report that people there prefer listening to the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia rather than South Korean broadcasts because the South does not criticize the North's government.

Kim Dae Jung contributed, consciously or not, to the growth of anti-Americanism. If his Sunshine Policy failed to bring peace, who is to blame? Many South Koreans point to the Americans. (This disposition helps account for what might otherwise seem paradoxical: widespread complacency about the North accompanied by worry for the fate of Seoul from attack. An explanation is that war could come only if the Americans start it.) An analysis of 2002 election results shows that younger voters preferred the winner, Roh Moo-Hyun, who had been critical of the U.S., and were less suspicious of the North than older voters who have memories of the Korean War and of American support in the hard times afterward. Roh had questioned the desirability of the American connection and seemed to want to help the North at least as much as did Kim Dae Jung — apparently still without serious conditions attached. It is too early to know how the responsibilities of power will affect him, but his supporters will resist a large change in policy.

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Another manifestation of change is Seoul's relationship with Beijing. South Korean and Chinese economic connections are flourishing, in both trade and investment. Their stances towards the North have also converged, albeit incompletely. Though the Chinese government seems more worried about the North's nuclear programs than does the South, neither wants to see a collapse, both have been helping the North, and they have a similar posture on its human rights abuses — one of indifference. On April 16, 2003, for example, South Korea abstained on a vote of the U.N. High Commission on Human Rights condemning North Korea for "widespread and grave" abuses of human rights. Its explanation was that it would upset the North just before the planned meeting in Beijing. China opposed the resolution.

Until circa 1990, one could fairly say that American and South Korean interests were congruent: Both were about the security of the South and its consolidation of democracy. The robustness of Korean democracy is no longer in doubt. The problem is security. Of course both want to avert war, but Americans (and Japanese and apparently Chinese) perceive greater dangers from the North's missile and nuclear weapons than do South Koreans. Southerners (rightly or wrongly) do not expect the North's missiles or nuclear weapons to land on them, nor do they see themselves as the target of nuclear-armed terrorists. Americans see themselves as threatened both ways.

South Koreans have long worried about a collapse of the North's government.

South Koreans have long worried about a collapse of the North's government. They fear millions of people coming south and the burden of financing the construction of the North's economy. Many use the costly unification of Germany as a reason (or perhaps rationalization) for keeping the status quo.[8] In any case, a large amount of outside capital would be needed (large relative to the South's economy but not in relation to world capital flows). As Marcus Noland notes in *Avoiding the Apocalypse*, a capital transfer of $300 billion to $500 billion could bring per capita incomes in the North to 60 percent of the South's level within 10 years. Although the long-run payoff to the people in the southern part of a unified Korea from a prosperous North would be high both economically and politically, there would be costs in between. Assuming that most of this capital would come from the South, growth there would be depressed during that decade by perhaps 1 percent a year.

[8]The German model is flawed. West Germany made mistakes that do not have to be repeated, such as decreeing that wages in the East would move immediately to the West German level despite 60 percent lower worker productivity.

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Here the U.S. has been neglectful. It is in our interest to commit now to helping the South with this financial burden if the North's regime collapses.[9]

The Roh government needs to decide on its goals. It cannot act as a middleman between the U.S. and the North. It needs to choose how much it values the American alliance versus helping to sustain a regime that threatens Seoul with destruction, whose military programs are rousing the Japanese to rearm, that sells missiles to all comers, and that might sell nuclear weapons.

China, Japan, and Russia

China's position is likely to be pivotal. Its leaders don't want to see a communist regime collapse; they don't want a flood of refugees coming to China; they don't want a war that would bring down the regime and might bring American forces to the Yalu; they don't want to see a rearmed Japan, especially a nuclear-armed one; and they want good relations with the United States. Nonetheless, they seem to be leaving the job of stopping it largely to us.

China's apparent lack of vigor might simply reflect a reluctance to tackle forcefully a fellow communist-ruled state many of whose senior officials are old comrades. Or might it be based on the view that the Americans and others will pay to solve it? Or, more ominously, might China judge that U.S.-South Korean differences will preclude war, that they will speed the departure of American forces from the mainland of Asia, and that Japan is no longer a major force? Whatever the combination of views in Beijing, a failure to act decisively could leave China with three more nuclear-armed neighbors — two in Korea plus Japan — along with other troubles.

The mirror image of the putative Chinese view — "Let the Americans solve it" — is an American one: "Let the Chinese solve it." Why is this not mainly a Chinese problem, on the view that they have more to lose than anyone else from a nuclear-armed Northeast Asia? That might be so if it were not for the North's possible sale of bomb materials. A more considered view is that we have enough shared interests with the Chinese to try jointly to solve the problem of the North.

The Chinese long claimed that they had little influence in Pyongyang. Relations between their leaders have been cool to frigid, but with China its principal supplier of food and fuel as well as the main obstacle to the flight of refugees, that position lacked credibility. Its supplies now are even more crucial to the regime's survival than in the past. And if China agreed not to return refugees but rather to send them on, and if South Korea (and the U.S.)

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[9]A notional example is a standby loan for the contingency of a North Korean collapse of $100 billion supplied by a consortium including the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and other lending agencies.

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agreed to take more of them, there would likely be a rush for the exit. One refugee has said that the cities would empty in six months.[10] For a horde of Koreans to arrive and stay in China is a nightmare for Beijing, but a position well short of threatening to empty the North of people — with refugees passing through to elsewhere — would put great pressure on Pyongyang.

The Chinese are edging towards doing more. Recently they let it be known that they cut off the North's fuel supply for 72 hours. They might come to see what is happening as sufficiently hazardous to warrant strong action. For instance, how do they regard the possibility of the North selling readily fissionable materials or fabricated bombs to anyone who pays enough? Is it beyond the bounds of possibility that such things could come into the hands of Uigher terrorists?

The Chinese have, to little avail, been telling Kim Jong Il to adopt the kinds of reforms that are transforming their economy. Perhaps they say (only to each other?) that what North Korea needs is a leader of the "Deng Xiaoping" sort. Worries are expressed in both South Korea and China about a Romanian-type regime collapse in the North, but too little attention has been given to a change in rulers within the same political structure. If they are sufficiently motivated, the Chinese are best positioned to bring it off.

Notwithstanding the speculations above on why China might not act decisively against the North, there is arguably a large overlapping interest with the United States. China's comparative advantage is in squeezing the North while that of the U.S. is in rouding up support from others and, if necessary, offering some kind of non-attack commitment.

If the Chinese decide to move against Kim, might they try for a larger goal: to try to engineer a peaceful unification of a non-nuclear, democratic Korea on condition that the Americans leave? Considering how we got there in the first place (to defend against an attack by a communist North backed by Soviet and Chinese power), that could look like not a bad outcome. (Surprises happen. If leaders of the two Koreas come to perceive that their fates are about to be decided by China and the U.S., might they act preemptively? But this line of argument is speculative in the extreme.)

As for Japan, the firing of a North Korean missile over that country in 1998 was a deeply disturbing event, to which is now added its nuclear weapons. There is also popular outrage at the North's kidnapping of Japanese citizens. These events are having consequences. The Japanese are doing R&D on ballistic missile defenses and are considering building them. There are reports about Japanese air and naval forces being given offensive

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[10] "A Human Face on North Koreans' Plight," *New York Times* (August 21, 2002). Mongolia is a possible way station for them. The number of North Korean refugees reaching the South has grown from 150 in 1999 to 1,200 in 2002 and might total 2,000 in 2003, according to the *Asahi Shimbun* (June 18, 2003). However, China has warned Mongolia not to become a haven for North Koreans.

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weapons. Japan would probably participate in a multilateral maritime weapons interdiction effort against the North, especially if approved by the United Nations. Talk about Japan getting nuclear weapons is still confined to the political fringe, but that could change if North Korea continues with its programs.

This crisis brings to the fore our role in the defense of Japan. So far we have been unable to assure the safety of Japan against North Korean threats; hence the growth in the attitude that Japan has to do more for itself. A big cut in our forces in Korea would have repercussions in Japan, and their total withdrawal even more so. Much would depend on the context. Our leaving in anything like the present situation would create alarm. On the other hand, a reduction or even withdrawal associated with the creation of a unified, democratic, non-nuclear Korea would be much less alarming. But even in so favorable a case, a new U.S.-Japan security formula would be needed. For now, the Japanese still hope the U.S. will solve this problem, and they are willing to help.

Russia is likely to remain a marginal player. It has as normal diplomatic relations as any country has with the North. Their trade is small. However, trade between a unified, capitalist Korea and the Russian Far East could become large and of great mutual benefit.

What should we do?

TODAY, THERE ARE many advocates of a deal that can be labeled Agreed Framework Mark II. One can guess at its contents. It would, again, entail promises by the North to forgo nuclear programs in exchange for benefits. These would include food and fuel — but surely not completing the two nuclear reactors under construction as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework.[11] It might also include cuts in conventional forces. (Having the North's army merely move back from the DMZ wouldn't accomplish much because it could quickly be returned.) The North is pressing for a commitment by the United States not to attack. This is less innocuous than it might seem. The threat here is a point of leverage in what is likely to be an ongoing series of confrontations, and given the North's record, we could find ourselves having to attack in self-defense. Suppose the North is found to be supplying nuclear weapons to al Qaeda?

The North's obligations would entail much more pervasive inspection and

[11]These large power reactors, being built by the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) are financed by Japan and South Korea (with the U.S. having regulatory authority). They would create large amounts of plutonium usable in weapons. Moreover, such large concentrations of electricity generation would be practically unusable without also building a more robust North Korean electricity grid.

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the removal of readily fissile materials (those which are found, that is) from the country. If this course is pursued, it would likely also include specific and closely monitored economic opening actions that would bring in outsiders — presumably South Koreans — widely throughout the country as well as specific actions on human rights.

To those who will inevitably argue that such demands would be rejected by the North and, anyway, the main aim is to stop the weapons programs, the response is: You have a good chance of not stopping the weapons; there will be other crises; we need a basic change in the North; and we can offer the North more benefits (i.e., money) to go with these demands.

The nuclear inspection task would be formidable, especially for fabricated weapons. The only way to have confidence that they are not present in a country known to have had them (e.g., South Africa) is for the country to be sufficiently open that insiders with knowledge can safely reveal cheating. That condition will not exist in Kim Jong Il's North Korea. The American effort to round up international support for inspecting and seizing exports of missiles and drugs at least puts pressure on the North in the maneuvering for an agreement. An economic blockade (excepting perhaps some food) might bring Kim down, and might be supported in the Security Council if proposed by the U.S. and China, but that brings us back to how far China is willing to go.

If something like an Agreed Framework Mark II is reached, there will be celebrations over having averted a great danger. One should not be too ready to carp at whatever emerges; this is a problem from hell. But elation would be premature. The inspection requirements for confidence that the fissile material production programs — and any fabricated bombs — are gone are so stringent as to be unlikely to be met, and as Pyongyang demonstrated recently, the inspectors could be thrown out at any time. It is axiomatic that any government headed by Kim Jong Il will have nuclear weapons, despite any agreement signed by his government (unless the Chinese take decisive action).

Therefore, we should aim to have a leadership in Pyongyang committed to developing the country, rather than surviving on nuclear extortion, as a step towards the political unification of the peninsula. This implies the end of the Kim dynasty. Since the end of the Korean War we have accepted the division and constant tensions, interspersed with crises, as inevitable. We have reacted to events instead of creating them. It is too dangerous to keep doing this.

Some suggested initiatives

WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE several initiatives as a part of or — to the extent we have not tied our hands in a negotiation — independently of any agreement.

Try to reach agreement with China on a strategy for eliminating the

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North's weapons. The Bush administration would have to trust China to deliver on a promise to rid the North of weapons and China would have to trust that the U.S. would deliver a (rather unpalatable, from the American perspective) package of concessions. But, to repeat, there are no good options.

Undertake a serious human rights campaign. Make human rights a major topic with the North — and in public. Focusing only on nuclear weapons enables Kim to beat the drum of nationalism and to avoid addressing his manifest domestic failings.

This effort should include the free exchange of people, religious liberty, open borders, and family reunification, as the recent joint "Statement of Principles for U.S.-North Korean Relations" urged (*Wall Street Journal*, January 18, 2003). Having recently expanded Korean-language broadcasting, we should do more to distribute information on human rights abuses and to investigate religious persecution. On refugees, we should press Russia and especially China to process refugee claims, press the UNHCR to invoke its treaty with China on access to refugees, and pass the bill in Congress granting North Korean refugees the same rights as Cubans.

Promote specific economic reforms. If we (meaning the coalition we are trying to form) end up supplying economic aid, some of it should be conditioned on specific liberalizing action in certain sectors, as Adam Garfinkle has argued in the *New Republic* (November 4, 2002). The principle should be "pay for performance." We should also be willing to help in educating North Koreans on markets and rule-of-law reforms. Given the minuscule size of the North's economy, the cost of the aid should not be much of an issue; the question is what we get for the money.

Work to find a successor to Kim. Several of the items discussed above would advance this aim. In addition, we should try to identify a potential North Korean "Deng Xiaoping" or a "Park Chung Hee." How this might be done is, of course, a large question, but one begins by identifying the need. Probably only China could engineer this — if anyone can.

At the end of a transition (which might be short), the aim is to have a peacefully united and democratic Korea without nuclear weapons, the North's top leaders retired, a rapidly developing North supported by outside investment, and perhaps a U.S. security linkage. That last decision should depend not only on Korean preferences, but also on how we then assess our role in Northeast Asian security.

That anything like the Kim dynasty is doomed should not be in doubt. The forces of economic and political liberalism are too powerful. The question is when and how it goes and what disasters occur before then. The time is late for us to be thinking about how to make it go away peacefully.

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Anti-Semitism and Ethnicity in Europe

By JOHN ROSENTHAL

"SAY THAT YOU'RE a Jew," Marinus Schöberl's tormentors are supposed to have demanded as they beat him. As of this writing, three young men — the brothers Marcel S. and Marco S., 18 and 24 years old respectively, and their friend Sebastien F., also 18 — are on trial in Neuruppin, Germany for the murder of the then-16-year-old Marinus near the small eastern German town of Potzlow in July 2002. None of the accused disputes his involvement, and the prosecution's reconstruction of the events leading to Marinus's death is based largely on the boys' own confessions. Marinus was not in fact Jewish, but various markers of "otherness" — the fact that the teenager stuttered, that he wore baggy "hip hop" pants, perhaps most importantly that his hair was dyed blond — were apparently sufficient to convince his three assailants that he was or might be. They "wanted to create for themselves the image of an enemy," Thomas Weichelt, the lawyer for Marinus's parents, has observed. A local district attorney told the *Berliner Zeitung* that the cruelty displayed in Marinus's murder "represents a new dimension even for hard-baked prosecutors." After having forced him to drink alcohol until inebriated, beaten him unconscious, and then urinated on him, the trio of assailants dragged Marinus to a nearby

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abandoned stable. There, having ordered Marinus to bite the side of a concrete feeding trough, Marcel S. stomped on the back of Marinus's head with his combat boots. After Marinus, nonetheless, apparently survived this maneuver, Marcel S. crushed his skull with a concrete slab. In a statement given to the police, another witness, Nicole B., reported that Marcel S. would later describe Marinus as a "shitty Jew" and remark that as such "he didn't deserve any different."[1]

The Potzlow case is significant in several respects, not the least of which is that it will likely be entirely unknown to my readers. It has of late become common for "liberal" commentators to charge that reports of European anti-Semitism are greatly exaggerated, part of yet another "vast right-wing conspiracy" fostered by powerful media moguls (read Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black) and designed to delegitimize European support of the Palestinian cause and "deflect" European criticisms of Israel. In fact, however, coverage in the English-language media as a whole, especially indeed the American media, has tended, if anything, to *understate* the true dimensions of the phenomenon.

Leftist myths and leftist responsibility

In early spring 2002, a wave of anti-Jewish arson attacks swept across France. In the most spectacular of the incidents, late on the Friday night of March 29-30, a group of 10-20 masked youths used two stolen cars as battering rams to smash through the front and side doors of the synagogue in the La Duchère section of Lyon and then, with the cars still ensconced in the building, set them ablaze. According to witnesses, as the cars caught fire, the perpetrators broke into applause. That weekend, synagogues would also be set ablaze in Strasbourg and Marseille and bullets would be fired at a kosher butcher shop in Toulouse. In the following week, at least three other synagogues — in Marseille, Montpellier, and the Kremlin-Bicêtre suburb of Paris — would be the targets of Molotov cocktails (with the Montpellier attack setting on fire an adjacent building). The wooden doors of a prayer chapel in a Jewish cemetery in Strasbourg were set on fire, as was the school bus of a Jewish school in another Parisian suburb. This sudden spike in what was an already-growing trend of anti-Jewish

[1] "Das lange Schweigen der Mitwisser," *Berliner Zeitung* (May 31, 2003). On the witness stand, Nicole B. would then deny that Marcel S. had made these remarks. Nicole B. is, incidentally, an ex-girlfriend of Marcel's elder brother Marco and is charged in a separate case with having been an accomplice of Marco in an attack on an African asylum seeker. The *Berliner Zeitung* reported (May 21, 2003) that she herself threatened another potential witness from Potzlow that "if you say anything, then I'm going to stomp you and let you rot like the Jew."

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violence in France was widely reported in the United States and even provoked some words of admonishment from President Bush. As the violence settled back into an alarmingly regular pattern, however, the interest of the English-language media waned — and this despite the fact that the more recent incidents, unlike the rash of reported violence last March and April, have included an increasing number of attacks on persons. When, for instance, just this past March, a 21-year-old Jewish student returning home from a debate on Middle East politics in Aix-en-Provence was attacked by three masked assailants who proceeded to carve a Star of David into her arm with a knife, such an event was apparently considered sufficiently banal as not to merit reporting by almost any American media outlet.[2]

Moreover, coverage of anti-Jewish violence in Europe has focused almost exclusively on France, with some occasional allusions to incidents in Belgium and Great Britain. This is also the case, incidentally, for most of the *European* coverage of anti-Jewish violence in Europe. Since the authors of the French violence are typically presumed to be (and often indeed turn out to be) North African immigrant youth from France's dilapidated *banlieues* — "a group itself that is the victim of some of the worst race hate and discrimination in Europe," according to the sympathetic assessment of Peter Beaumont in the British weekly *Observer* (February 17, 2002) — the assumption is then easily made that the problem is not really a European one anyway, but has merely been imported into Europe along with Muslim immigration. And the Muslim youth can, after all, be forgiven — so this line of reasoning continues — for taking offense at Israel's "heavy-handed" treatment of their co-religionists in the Middle East conflict. This is the clear implication of Beaumont's *Observer* piece, which thus appears to treat the logic of targeting *French* Jews in retribution for Israeli policies as somehow self-evident. We will see shortly just how erroneous an account this is *even* of the forces driving anti-Jewish violence among France's North African immigrant population.

Coverage of anti-Jewish violence in Europe has focused almost exclusively on France.

Germany, in any case, is rarely mentioned in this context. This is odd, since although the murder of Marinus Schöberl was notable for the baroqueness of the cruelty involved, it was by no means an isolated incident with respect to the anti-Jewish motives involved. The number of anti-Jewish incidents officially reported in Germany is in fact greater than the number of those reported in France. According to statistics published by the French Consultative Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH), there were 924 anti-

[2] "Agression antisémite contre une étudiante," *Le Figaro* (March 13, 2003).

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Jewish incidents reported to the French police in 2002. This figure comprises both acts of violence committed against persons or property (193) and "threats and acts of intimidation" (including under this latter heading, for example, the desecration of Jewish monuments with anti-Semitic graffiti). For the same year and covering roughly the same array of crimes, the German Ministry of the Interior records some 1,594 reported incidents. It is true that Germany has not experienced the sort of marked *upsurge* in anti-Jewish crime in recent years that has been recorded in France, but this is only because the German incidents, as will be seen below, form part of a much longer-term trend dating back to around the time of German reunification. With reference to its 2002 statistics, the French Commission could accurately speak of "an explosion of anti-Semitic incidents," noting a six-fold rise. By contrast, the 1,594 incidents recorded by the German Ministry of the Interior for 2002 represent a slight *decrease* from the previous year, thus permitting Interior Minister Otto Schily, in light of this statistic and a similarly slight fall in reported xenophobic attacks, to announce a "success."[3] Furthermore, those German cases involving physical attacks on persons have tended on the whole to be far bloodier than the comparable French cases. Indeed, it should be noted here that the German authorities seem often to prefer not to classify particularly brutal attacks as anti-Semitic in nature even when the prima facie evidence clearly suggests anti-Semitic motives were involved. The murder of Marinus Schöberl, for instance, has not been so classified.

Anti-Jewish incidents in Germany form part of a long-term trend dating back to German reunification.

Despite all this, when the television newsmagazine *60 Minutes* recently ran a story on the role of the Holocaust in German public debate (June 1, 2003), Morley Safer could reassuringly preface the report by noting that "most of Germany's Jews . . . see that country as one of the safest places in the world to raise their children." It is as if there were a sort of taboo, in light of the exterminationist extreme to which German anti-Semitism has gone in the past, on bringing Germany into too close connection with discussions of anti-Semitism today. This reticence is perhaps reinforced by the prevailing belief in American political circles that as the dominant European power — not to mention a major source of foreign investment in the U.S. economy — Germany is or at least ought to be America's privileged European partner.

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[3]The Ministry of the Interior reported some 1,624 anti-Semitic incidents for 2001. See "Weniger politisch motivierte Straftaten in Deutschland," Deutsche Press Agentur (May 14, 2002).

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Individual peccadilloes do receive coverage, such as those of the late Jürgen Möllemann, the onetime vice-chairman of Germany's Free Democratic Party, who was accused by his adversaries of having tried to exploit anti-Jewish resentments for electoral purposes during the summer 2002 election campaign. Symptomatically, the *60 Minutes* report gave prominent place to the commentaries of Michel Friedman, then vice-president of Germany's state-sanctioned Central Council of Jews in Germany and the target of what the report described as a "blatant anti-Semitic attack" by Möllemann. But as such apparent indiscretions come up only in the context of the vigorous intra-German reactions to them, they serve in fact to reinforce the image of a Germany safely protected from the anti-Semitic excesses of its past. Möllemann, after all, was forced to resign from all his party posts, expelled from the FDP's parliamentary faction — he was assigned a special seat in the German Bundestag, set apart from all the other parliamentarians, as if he were politically leprous — and, finally, when faced with the threat of expulsion from the party as well, renounced his party membership altogether.

It is as if there were a sort of taboo on bringing Germany into too close connection with discussions of anti-Semitism today.

And the chastening of the once-powerful Möllemann went still further. Shortly after the elections, public prosecutors opened an investigation into alleged financial misconduct by Möllemann in connection with the financing of a controversial campaign flyer. The flyer drew criticism on account of what was termed its "anti-Israeli" message, though many suggested anti-Semitic overtones as well. Although the investigation was not officially related to the content of the flyer, the impression was nevertheless created that Möllemann was somehow receiving his just deserts. The entire episode came to an abrupt and bizarre end shortly after noon on June 5 when Jürgen Möllemann, a member of Germany's paratrooper reserves and a hobby skydiver, jumped out of an airplane and at 3,000 feet apparently uncoupled his parachute, plunging to his death. A mere quarter of an hour or so earlier, the Bundestag by a unanimous vote had withdrawn Möllemann's parliamentary immunity, and at the very moment of his demise investigators were at his home preparing to search the premises.

The Möllemann affair had thus concluded as a sort of morality play, illustrating what will happen to a German politician who dares to engage in anti-Jewish politicking. But the problem with the apparent lesson of Jürgen Möllemann's decline and fall is that his supposedly culpable remarks and public interventions, while clearly supportive of the Palestinian intifada and openly hostile to the Israeli government of Ariel Sharon, were not in fact

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overtly, much less "blatantly," anti-Semitic. The infamous flyer, for instance, contained the following caption beside a picture of Möllemann: "Jürgen W. Möllemann has long been a steadfast advocate of a peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict: with secure borders for Israel and an independent state for the Palestinians." Next to a picture of Ariel Sharon, the text continued: "Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon rejects an independent Palestinian state. His government sends tanks into refugee camps and ignores U.N. Security Council decisions." In the context of hysterical denunciations of a Jenin "massacre" or even "Jeningrad," charges of genocide, and comparisons of Sharon to Adolf Hitler, this was comparatively tame stuff.

Möllemann's only originality — and perhaps greatest sin — was to have given such free expression to his partisanship from the position of a high-profile party *leader*, and as a leader of a self-styled *centrist* party no less. If in his Middle East advocacy Möllemann was guilty of an anti-Israeli bias, then this is a guilt that is shared by virtually the entirety of the European left, ranging from relatively fringe Trotskyist or Communist factions to what might be called the establishment Green/Socialist left, which governs in Germany and until lately (with the collaboration of the Communists) did in France as well. Even the most seemingly outrageous of Möllemann's remarks — an outright apology for Palestinian suicide bombings as a legitimate form of resistance to "occupation" — was in substance no different from remarks one could already hear with mind-numbing regularity at virtually any meeting of "anti-globalization" activists across Europe. (In the meanwhile, of course, such observations have also passed into the vernacular of what counts as political debate on college campuses across America.) As the German political scientist Matthias Küntzel writes in his book *Djihad und Judenhass* (Ça ira Verlag, 2002), "while the escalation of the suicide bombings should have led to increased solidarity with the largely Jewish victims and a taking of distance from the organizers of the attacks, on the left exactly the opposite transpired: the more indiscriminately Palestinian commandos killed Israeli civilians, the more frenetically was the intifada covered with 'anti-imperialist' applause." Indeed, it is probably not a coincidence that Möllemann made his remark in an interview with Germany's trendiest leftist daily: the Berlin-based *Tageszeitung*, long allied to the German Greens.

Möllemann's remarks were not in fact overtly, much less "blatantly," anti-Semitic.

The outbreak of anti-Semitic violence in France has clearly been linked to this groundswell of support for the Second Intifada. For leftist commentators like Peter Beaumont, this is to be expected: It is only natural that France's North African immigrants would feel solidarity with their Muslim brethren in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and apparently also natural that

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they would seek to express this solidarity by way of attacks on Jews and Jewish institutions. The then-foreign minister of France, the Socialist Hubert Védrine, himself suggested as much in a January 2002 interview when, in dismissing Israeli warnings of rising French anti-Semitism, he remarked: "One shouldn't necessarily be surprised that young French people from immigrant families feel compassion for the Palestinians and get agitated when they see what is happening." But this standard "leftist" account is in fact a highly deceptive foreshortening and tells us more about the biases and preconceptions of its purveyors than about the actual attitudes of France's North African immigrants (which, as the case tends to be among individuals, are various). What is missing from it is, above all, the crucial mediating role played by the French institutional left's own partisanship in the issue, most notably inasmuch as such partisanship has been reflected in a starkly Manichean presentation of the Middle East conflict in much of the French media. Since the privately owned leftist dailies *Le Monde* and *Liberation* are barely read in the provinces or in popular milieus more generally, the influence of publicly owned electronic media has no doubt been especially important in this connection. Coverage in the latter has persistently served to demonize the Israeli side in the conflict as personified by the "war criminal" — so termed by the Franco-German "cultural" channel Arte, although he has never been tried, much less convicted, as such — Ariel Sharon.

Coverage in the publicly owned electronic media has persistently served to demonize the Israeli side in the conflict.

Shortly after the string of synagogue burnings in spring 2002, journalists from the French weekly *L'Express* conducted interviews with young North Africans, or "*beurs,*" from one of the problem neighborhoods of Strasbourg. While indeed discovering notable hostility to Israel and "the Jews," the reporters also found that their interviewees had virtually no concrete knowledge of the Middle East conflict. They were evidently not even able to say what the PLO is. "No," one young man responded, "all we know is what we see on the television."

The question, then, is this: What *do* they see on the television? After all, a first spike in anti-Jewish incidents in France occurred shortly after the showing on French television of the now-internationally famous images of the killing of the 12-year-old Palestinian boy Mohammed al-Dura, ostensibly by Israeli fire. As related by James Fallows in the *Atlantic Monthly* (June 2003), investigations have since uncovered evidence suggesting that the entire episode may have been staged. Whether or not this is the case, it is certain, by virtue of simple considerations of geometry, that the supposedly fatal shots could not have come from the position of the Israeli army unit that virtually the entirety of world opinion held responsible for the boy's

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death. It so happens that the only footage of the alleged shooting was filmed by a Palestinian cameraman in the employ of the French public television channel France 2. France 2 has refused to release its complete rushes of the scene, which could once and for all clarify what really occurred.

The young *beurs* interviewed by *L'Express* (April 25, 2002) also were not found to have any particularly profound interest in Islam, even if the same young man who spoke of "only knowing what we see on the television" added obligingly, apparently with reference to anti-Jewish violence, that "we want to show that we're Muslims here too." A relative lack of interest in Islam has also been confirmed by the French police in interviews with many of the young persons of North African descent who have been apprehended and charged in the attacks. This is not particularly surprising. In fact, until lately the image of Islamists in French-North African popular culture was, if anything, likely to be a negative one. Mahmoud Zemmouri's 1997 movie *100% Arabica*, starring the hugely popular Algerian-born *rai* singers Khaled and Cheb Mami, depicts the imams in a French *banlieue* as brutal puritanical power-mongers — and as being in bed with the local political establishment to boot. The movie ends with a scene of a *rai* concert being broken up by Islamist thugs swinging baseball bats. (Incidentally, Khaled's 2000 release *Kenza* includes a trilingual — Arabic, English, and Hebrew — duet version of John Lennon's "Imagine" performed with the Israeli singer Noa. The song is, of course, best known for its generic pacifist sentiment, but it is at least equally relevant to recall in the present context that it also enjoins listeners to "imagine there's . . . no religion.")

Far from reflecting some deep-rooted and organic hatred of Jews and Israel amidst France's populations of North African extraction, it would seem, then, that the anti-Semitic attacks are just the pursuit by other means of the latest cause célèbre of Parisian intellectuals and students, with disaffected and déclassé North African teenagers happily assuming the role of "shock troops" for their more privileged comrades *au centre ville*. One should not underestimate the quotient of sheer delinquency among the motivations of the perpetrators of the French attacks. The youth who set fire to Jewish monuments in Strasbourg are not likely very different from the youth who for years now have every weekend also been setting fire to parked cars in Strasbourg, apparently for the pure pleasure of it. On April 10, 2002, in one of the most widely reported incidents, some 30 masked assailants armed with baseball bats and crying "Death to the Jews!" broke up the soccer practice of a Jewish youth club in a Parisian suburb. As the soccer players scattered, the assailants took a moment to steal their sport sacks and portable telephones — the latter being the most coveted prize of France's juvenile gangsterdom — before taking flight themselves.

All of this is not to deny that anti-Jewish stereotypes and prejudices have currency in certain North African immigrant milieus in France. But it is to say that they do not necessarily have *more* currency there than in *other* social milieus and, in any case, that the responses of the French left and the

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French media to the Palestinian intifada have served to make Jews and Jewish institutions seem like *socially acceptable* targets of hatred and contempt in France. After all, it was *before* synagogues began to burn in France that protesters could be seen at pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Paris carrying banners juxtaposing Sharon and Hitler or featuring a swastika and a Star of David connected by an equal sign.

The responsibility of self-styled leftists in fostering an atmosphere of fevered suspicion toward "Israelite" institutions can be further gauged by the famous remarks of José Bové, spokesman for the Confederation of French Farmers and darling of anti-globalization activists worldwide, made upon his return to France in early April 2002 from a "solidarity mission" to Ramallah. Asked to comment on the recent string of anti-Semitic attacks, Bové suggested that one ask in turn "who profits from the crime?" About six months earlier, the French academic Marie-José Mondzain had used the same phrase in a delirious article in *Le Monde* in order to insinuate ("Bush, Putin and Sharon!" was the author's emphatic answer) joint Israeli and American responsibility for the September 11 attacks. Horst Mahler, the German neo-Nazi and former RAF member, had likewise responded to the September 11 attacks by asking "cui bono?" In his April remarks, Bové went on to explain that "the Israeli government and its secret services have an interest in creating a certain psychosis, to make one believe that an anti-Semitic atmosphere has developed in France, in order better to divert attention." In the meantime, Daniel Lindenberg, in a bestselling pamphlet denouncing those he has baptized France's "new reactionaries" — including under this heading the philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff, who was one of the first to call attention to the recrudescence of anti-Semitism in France — has flatly declared "the reality" of France's problems with anti-Semitism to be "open to doubt."

Germany: New Jews, old prejudice

By contrast to the French case, in which the recent escalation of anti-Jewish violence has followed the rhythms of Middle East politics and Parisian intellectual fashions, anti-Semitic incidents in Germany have been a regular feature of everyday life since reunification. Their proliferation first became manifest amidst the wave of xenophobic and racist violence which swept across Germany in the early 1990s and which — even though in this case too the interest of the foreign media quickly waned — has since that time barely abated. Whereas the targets of the most notorious racist attacks were persons — Turkish "guest-workers" or foreign asylum-seekers — the targets of the anti-Semitic incidents tended for most of this period to have a strictly symbolic character. Indeed, it could hardly have been otherwise. After all, as an obvious legacy of the Nazi regime's "Jewish policy," there were until recently an almost infinitesimally

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small number of persons of Jewish ancestry living in Germany (or at least such as would have, according to the Nazis' own relatively ample criteria, counted as Jewish).

Thus, the anti-Semites in Germany have had to content themselves largely with attacks on the residual artifacts of an earlier Jewish existence — Jewish cemeteries or the few remaining synagogues — or indeed on memorials to the events which extinguished that existence. On the night of September 4-5, 2002, for example, vandals set fire to the so-called Museum of the Death March in the Belower Forest. The museum owes its name to one of the final chilling episodes in the history of the Third Reich. In April 1945, as allied forces closed in on Berlin, inmates of the nearby Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück concentration camps were evacuated by the SS and led on a forced march toward the north and west. Thousands died, hundreds of them in the Belower Forest, falling victim to exhaustion, the elements, and the exactions of their guards. The arson attack on the Belower memorial occurred exactly 10 years to the day after the "Jewish barracks" at the Sachsenhausen camp were destroyed in an earlier arson attack. The perpetrators of the latest attack spray-painted swastikas and SS runes on memorial columns standing across from the museum building. On the columns' pedestal, in meter-high letters running three meters across, they spray-painted the phrase "*Juden haben kurze Beine*": "Jews have short legs." The phrase makes allusion to the German proverb "lies have short legs," implying that their credibility is short-lived, and hence indirectly to what Holocaust deniers label the "Auschwitz lie."

The destruction of the Museum of the Death March did receive some coverage in the American press, but the everyday acts of anti-Semitic vandalism that have become part of German normality for over a decade now rarely do. Since late 1998, solely in Berlin and its surroundings, the following acts of vandalism took place: (1) In December 1998, the gravestone of Heinz Galinski, a former chairman of Berlin's officially sanctioned "Jewish Community," was blown up; (2) in October 1999, 103 gravestones were overturned in the Jewish cemetery at Weissensee; (3) in October 2000, the windows of a synagogue on the Fraenkelufer in Kreuzberg were smashed; (4) in January 2001, the prayer chapel at the Jewish cemetery in Potsdam was set on fire; (5) in March 2002, a bomb was exploded in the Jewish cemetery in the Heerstrasse; (6) in April 2002, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the Fraenkelufer synagogue. It should be kept in mind that by far the greater part of Berlin's synagogues were already destroyed either during or immediately after World War II. The various small memorials to the persecution of Berlin's Jews that are dispersed around the city are regularly desecrated. For many years now, a plaque commemorating the deportation of Berlin's Jews located on the Putlitz Bridge in western Berlin has been a favorite target for anti-Semitic vandals. Since 1992, it has, among other things, been covered with excrement, blown off its moorings with explosives, and repeatedly desecrated with swastikas.

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One can easily imagine that Peter Eisenman's gigantic "central memorial" to the Holocaust to be erected in downtown Berlin will someday likewise be a magnet for anti-Semitic attacks. Its design is so abstract, however, consisting of a field with some 2,500 concrete slabs of differing heights, and so lacking in any relation to the events it is supposed to memorialize that its power of attraction for the anti-Semites may be attenuated. Nonetheless, the architects are taking the precaution of having the slabs treated with a special "anti-graffiti coating," according to the *Berliner Zeitung* (January 27, 2002).

Given the relative paucity of Jews in Germany, contemporary German anti-Semitism tends to have a certain spectral quality. Anti-Semitic youth such as those who murdered Marinus Schöberl have likely never met someone of Jewish ancestry or would not have known it if they had. Indeed, in his deposition Marcel S. admitted as much, conceding that he did not know what "exactly" a Jew is.[4] Not having living Jews readily available in a provincial town like Potzlow, the anti-Semite must resort to imagining them.

A very small number of media personalities, conspicuously marked for their "Jewishness," play a significant role in this state of affairs by providing the German public with the elements of their image of what constitutes a Jew. Among these public figures, no doubt the most important is Michel Friedman, until lately the vice-president of Germany's Central Council of Jews in Germany and host of two television talk shows, *Friedman* and *Vorsicht! Friedman* (roughly "Watch Out, Friedman!"). It was Michel Friedman, it will be recalled, who was the target of what *60 Minutes* called a "blatantly anti-Semitic attack" on the part of Jürgen Möllemann during the 2002 German election campaign. Exactly what Möllemann said was this: "I fear that hardly anyone has won more supporters for the anti-Semites that, unfortunately, there are in Germany and whom we have to fight than . . . Michel Friedman with his intolerant and malicious manner, his arrogant manner."[5] This remark was widely interpreted — notably by Friedman's direct superior in the Central Council, Paul Spiegel — as a version of the classical retort of the anti-Semite that Jews themselves are responsible for anti-Semitism. Indeed, it became common to suppose that this was actually what Möllemann said. In fairness, however, he did not, and it is by no means obvious that he even implied it. His remark referred to a particular individual (in fact two individuals, since he also mentioned in passing Ariel Sharon), *not* to Jews in general.

Moreover, whether or not Möllemann intended it as such, as a sociologi-

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[4]"Gequält, erniedrigt, erschlagen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (May 27, 2003).

[5]The comment was made on May 16 in an interview with the German public television channel ZDF. See the documentation of the "Möllemann Affair" assembled by the Mitteldeutschen Rundfunk at http://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/137198-hintergrund-427278.html.

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cal observation his remark probably has some validity, for there can be little doubt that Friedman serves at once as a kind of support for anti-Semitic stereotypes and a magnet for anti-Semitic resentments in Germany. Impeccably clad in a three-piece suit, with his hair slicked back and an eyebrow or two characteristically arched, it has often seemed as if Friedman were consciously playing the role that the German public has assigned him. He is, in effect, the Jew whom Germans love to hate. The popular response to the Möllemann affair massively confirms this. Thus, in a contribution to an internet forum, one defender of Möllemann chose to address Friedman directly and on behalf of all his presumed compatriots: "your arrogant and revolting manner really gets on the nerves of us Germans." In the condolence book at Möllemann's funeral, another sympathizer wrote that Möllemann had been punished "for saying what everyone thinks." In yet another bizarre and theatrical turn in the whole affair, on June 11, less than a week after the violent death of his political adversary Möllemann, police conducted raids at the office and home of Michel Friedman and seized three plastic bags containing a white powder. Tests subsequently confirmed the presence of cocaine. The police were reportedly led to Friedman by the testimony of prostitutes whom they were questioning in connection with another investigation. It was now the turn of Michel Friedman to resign his public offices.

The spectral quality of contemporary German anti-Semitism is not without a certain tradition.

The spectral quality of contemporary German anti-Semitism is not, by the way, without a certain tradition. The paranoid exaggeration of Jewish presence and thereby of "the Jewish threat" is a more or less constant trait of the anti-Semitic *Weltanschauung*. In the late 1990s, when Jews in Germany numbered in the tens of thousands, about a third of Germans surveyed imagined them to number in the millions.[6] Even in the early 1930s, as the Nazis came to power promising to combat the "*Verjudung*" or "Jewification" of German society, the number of Jews in Germany did not exceed 600,000 or just around 1 percent of the population. Most German Jews, moreover, were concentrated in urban centers. As in the Potzlow of today, Jews would have been largely unknown in most rural areas. Thus, a joke which circulated at the time of Göring's famous call

[6]The survey was conducted by the Forsa Institute for the weekly paper *die Woche*, which published the results in its December 24, 1998 edition. This is not to say, of course, that every such response can be regarded without further ado as an index of the anti-Semitism of the respondent. But even in the most well-intended of cases, it would seem at least to be symptomatic of an odd sort of involuntary negationsm.

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for a "Jewish boycott" in April 1933 had the mayor of a small town in East Prussia sending an urgent telegram to the Ministry of the Interior: "Send two Jews immediately. Otherwise boycott impossible."

Ironically, in light of the post-reunification recrudescence of anti-Semitism, the vast majority of Jews living in Germany today are in fact recent immigrants. Most of them have come to Germany from the countries of the former Soviet Union under the provisions of a law inherited by the Federal Republic from the last East German government. Whereas the number of Jews living in Germany was estimated at somewhat less than 30,000 at the time of reunification, it is perhaps four times that many today. More ironically still, the German government's assumption of the obligations created by the East German law was presented as a "humanitarian" measure aimed at populations presumed to suffer from anti-Semitic persecution in their countries of origin. The immigrants are thus treated as refugees — so-called "contingent refugees," meaning they are not required to pass through the usual asylum procedure — and classified by the German authorities, following former Soviet and current German practice, as being "of Jewish nationality." Unlike refugees from former Soviet lands presumed to be "of German nationality" (i.e., "ethnic Germans"), they are not given German citizenship.

In what is perhaps the bloodiest and most gruesome incident of anti-Semitic violence in postwar European history, in July 2000 a cluster bomb was detonated on the platform of a Düsseldorf train station as a group of "contingent refugees" were waiting there for their train. Ten people were wounded. A five-months-pregnant Jewish woman from the Ukraine had her leg ripped off in the explosion. Her unborn child was killed as a bomb fragment pierced her womb. Although the same group of refugees, all of whom were enrolled in a German course at a nearby school, took the same train at the same time every weekday, the German authorities have declined to qualify the incident as a racist or anti-Semitic attack. No arrest has been made.

The location of the attack, furthermore, gives the lie to the supposition, frequently reproduced in the American media, that xenophobia and anti-Semitism are somehow a specifically *eastern* German problem and thereby a legacy of communist rule. Opinion surveys conducted shortly after reunification found, on the contrary, that East Germans were markedly *less* predisposed to anti-Semitic prejudices than West Germans.[7] In a manner reminiscent of the receptivity of certain North African youth in the French *banlieues* to the anti-Semitic delirium of Islamist cadres, the demonstrated receptivity of certain East German youth to the anti-Semitic delirium of neo-Nazi cadres has no doubt as much to do with social marginalization and the

[7]This according to a study conducted by the Emnid Institute. The results of the Emnid study are summarized in two consecutive issues of *Der Spiegel* (January 13, 1992 and January 20, 1992).

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search for a scapegoat as with any deep-seated ideological convictions. With the official unemployment rate in eastern Germany pushing 20 percent and the real unemployment rate much higher, the prospects for advancement of young Germans in the eastern provinces are nearly as dim as those of the average young *banlieusard* in France. That anti-Semitic sentiment is no more restricted to one social stratum than it is to one geographical area in Germany can be further gauged by an incident last November in the moderately well-to-do Spandau neighborhood of Berlin. Spandau, incidentally, is part of what used to be *West* Berlin. After many years of discussion, Spandau's Kinkelstrasse was being re-christened "Judenstrasse" — literally "Jews Street" — the name it bore until 1938 when it had been re-named "Kinkelstrasse" by the Nazi regime. As Alexander Brenner, the current chairman of Berlin's "Jewish Community," attempted to give a speech on the occasion, he was interrupted by cries of "*Juden raus!*" ("Jews get out!") as well as "You Jews are to blame for everything" and "You have no God." The local FDP politician Karl-Heinz Bannasch, who was participating in the ceremony, noted afterwards that "these weren't the skinhead people from whom we're used to hearing such insults. These were people who belong to the middle class."

An anti-Semitism of the elites

Even if the comments of the Spandau hecklers bore the specific mark of German history, similar observations could be made nowadays throughout at least the "old" Europe. For if anti-Semitic violence has become increasingly prevalent on the margins of the European society of today, anti-Semitic motifs are increasingly prevalent in the mainstream. No one who has spent significant time in continental Europe recently — or at least no one for whom anti-Semitism has not yet taken on the air of normalcy — can fail to have noticed the frequency with which apparently well-educated Europeans will refer, without the slightest hint of self-consciousness, to "powerful Jewish interests" or to a putative "Jewish lobby" in order to explain world or local events of which they disapprove. A Greek journalist friend even reports overhearing two well-dressed women in their early sixties commenting that "the Jews" were, after all, "too powerful" back then and they are becoming "too powerful" again today — this as they attended a showing in Athens of Roman Polanski's saga of the Warsaw Ghetto, *The Pianist*![8] One can only conclude from such remarks that an alarmingly high percentage of Europeans believe that there really *is* some such "lobby" and that persons of Jewish ancestry necessarily perceive their interests *as Jews* and not simply as individuals or as citizens of their respec-

[8]My thanks to Loukia Richards for relating this anecdote.

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tive states or, for that matter, amidst myriad other social and personal connections.

The European elites bear a heavy responsibility in this regard, for it is their own manifest indulgence of and indeed *in* the classical motifs of "Jewish conspiracy" theories — notably with regard to Middle East politics and their criticisms of American foreign policy — that will have made the specific choice of Jews as scapegoats seem quite legitimate. The American public got a hint of this style of discourse in September of last year when William Safire in the *New York Times* (September 19, 2002) cited Rudolf Scharping, Germany's former minister of defense, as explaining President Bush's eagerness to oust Saddam Hussein by the influence of "a powerful — perhaps overly powerful — Jewish lobby." It is interesting to note that, when Scharping sent a letter of denial to the *Times* (October 4, 2002), he disowned "blaming American Jews" for the Bush administration's Iraq policy but went on to refer to the "understandable" interests of American Jews as being somehow especially germane to the issue. Since Scharping, like the government he lately represented, was radically opposed to any military intervention in Iraq, this amounted to a rather feeble rhetorical attempt to square the circle. As an empirical matter, furthermore, he would have had to look no further than the pages of, say, a *Tikkun* magazine to find American Jews and even self-styled Zionists who were as hostile to the administration's Iraq policy as he was himself. But it is precisely the peculiarity of anti-Semitism as an ideology to efface the empirical diversity of individuals and to conceive Jews as acting everywhere en bloc.

The denouement to the controversy surrounding Gretta Duisenberg's Palestinian flag is similarly revealing. Mrs. Duisenberg is the wife of Wim Duisenberg, the outgoing president of the European Central Bank. Having, on her own account, carried the flag in a pro-Palestinian rally in mid-April 2002 — a rally at which, according to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, slogans like "Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the Gas!" were chanted — she then proceeded to hang it from the balcony of the Duisenberg family home in Amsterdam. When, some weeks later, Jewish neighbors called Mrs. Duisenberg to object to the presence of the flag and ask her to remove it, she is supposed to have deflected their objections with the observation that "rich Jews" are responsible for "the oppression of the Palestinian people." This is at least how Mrs. Duisenberg was quoted in the Dutch press, based on the reports of the neighbors in question.

At this point she took matters into her own hands, going public with her account of the conversation in order to avoid any possible misunderstandings. Here again, the ostensible denial speaks more voluminously and thereby more damningly about the mindset of contemporary European elites than the original quotation. "I did not say that rich Jews," Mrs. Duisenberg explained, "but rather that the rich Jewish lobby in America maintains the oppression of the Palestinians. Every president who is elected and who wants to be reelected must do what this lobby wants." Her critics "will have

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to come up with something better than childishly accusing me of being guilty of anti-Semitism," she added defiantly, confident that the addition of the noun "lobby" had cleared her of any such suspicion.[9] In today's Europe the presumption that the American presidency is hostage to a "rich Jewish lobby" is apparently supposed to be not a symptom of submission to archetypal anti-Semitic phantasms, but rather a sign of lucidity.

Finally, consider the observations on American foreign policy of Otto von Habsburg, heir to the defunct Habsburg monarchy and long-time member of the European Parliament representing Bavaria's Christian Social Union. Interviewed last November by the Austrian weekly *Zur Zeit*, Habsburg declared the Pentagon to be "today a Jewish institution," and thereby explained the then-pending threat to Iraq. In making such an association, Habsburg's comments were not in fact much different from those of Scharping or Duisenberg. It was, however, in his more comprehensive and fine-grained analysis of the American conjuncture that Habsburg showed some real originality. More fully, this is what he said: "If we consider America's internal politics, then we find that it is split in two halves. On the one hand, the Defense Department, in which the key positions are held by Jews; the Pentagon is today a Jewish institution. On the other hand, the blacks are in the State Department: for instance, Colin Powell or especially Condoleezza Rice. It is an internal conflict between hawks and doves. Currently, the Anglo-Saxons, that's to say the white Americans, are playing a relatively minor role." Far from earning the opprobrium of the European elites and the European media for such overtly racist (not to mention rather demented) remarks, just days after making them Habsburg was being celebrated by the European institutions and in the European press on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday. Munich's *Suddeutschezeitung*, for instance, ran a profile, describing, among other things, "a reception and ceremony in the Hofburg [the former imperial residence in Vienna], where Otto von Habsburg made a speech in French and German — extemporaneously as always — in honor of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, by whom he had previously been lauded." Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president, was at the time chairman of the recently concluded European convention charged with drafting a "constitution" for the European Union. The article noted that Habsburg was soon thereafter off to yet another birthday party, this one in the Gödölö Palace in Budapest: "he is, after all, by blood also Magyar."

The mobilization against the Iraq war has permitted such associations — of Jews, "hawks," the Pentagon, and so on — to gain a still firmer and broader footing in the collective European psyche or what the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has celebrated as an emergent "European public opinion." Indeed, a string of remarkably similar articles that appeared in many of the leading organs of the European press last spring

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[9]Deniz Yücel, "Palituch am Dekolleté," *Jungle World* (June 5, 2002).

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served to condense all the associated terms into a single term: "neo-conservatives." A story that appeared in London's *Financial Times* under the title "America's Democratic Imperialists" (March 5, 2003) is exemplary of the genre. While adopting the register of "some people say" and affecting to nuance the claims of "leftwing demonology," the article traced the origins of the Bush administration's Iraq policy to a clique of "neo-conservatives" in and around the White House. Elaborating on the history of "neo-conservatism," the authors explained that "Most of the first generation of neo-conservatives were Jewish; just about all of the later neocons were." Interestingly, the alleged internal opposition to the "neocon" faction in the White House was supposed to be provided by none other than Colin Powell *and* Condoleezza Rice — here gropingly identified as "realists" rather than "blacks" — and, furthermore, in complete harmony with Otto von Habsburg's account, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and John Bolton — in effect, the presumptive "white Americans" or "Anglo-Saxons" — were explicitly set apart from the "neocons." On the very same day as the *Financial Times* story appeared, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin was cited in the French weekly *Le Canard Enchaîné* denouncing a "pro-Zionist lobby" in the Bush administration supposed to consist of Paul Wolfowitz, Elliot Abrams, and Richard Perle — all three also mentioned by name in the *Financial Times* article.

In today's Europe the presumption that the American presidency is hostage to a "rich Jewish lobby" is apparently a sign of lucidity.

If one reflects on the examples here cited, the diversity of the political currents from which they stem is striking. When it comes to suspecting shadowy "Jewish" forces behind dastardly American policies, Christian Democrats like Habsburg and Social Democrats like Scharping are apparently in perfect agreement. As ravings about the machinations of Mossad, on the other hand, have become the stock in trade of what might be called the extra-parliamentary European left, as exemplified by a José Bové, one is left wondering what the great fuss was supposed to be about last spring as the French National Front leader and reputed racist and anti-Semite Jean-Marie Le Pen made some modest gains in the French presidential elections. Especially in light of their highly orchestrated quality, it is difficult not to suspect that the mass demonstrations called by "the left" ostensibly to prevent what was in any case a virtual impossibility (viz., a Le Pen victory in the second round of the elections) served more effectively as eyewash to obscure the extent to which anti-Semitism and a certain sort of racism (on which, more below) have installed themselves very much in the mainstream of European political discourse. In

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this sense, the French mobilization against Le Pen served much the same function of ritualized purging as the German campaign against Möllemann. Toddlers could be viewed at the Paris demonstration, for instance, bearing signs reading "Down with the National Front!" — prompting more jaded observers to mutter in response: "Down with the exploitation of children."

The examples are also revealing of the manner in which the prevailing anti-Semitism in Europe forms a system with the typically more openly avowed anti-Americanism. On a popular level, this gets crudely and symptomatically expressed by the allusions to Coca-Cola and McDonald's — those icons of supposedly "Americanized" globalization — that are a virtually constant feature of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations and discourse in Europe. In May 2002, this author was himself witness to a pro-Palestinian rally in Paris's Barbès district, during which the main speaker delivered a head-spinning harangue alleging that every hamburger purchased at McDonald's creates revenues for the Israeli state which are in turn used to purchase tanks to kill Palestinian children. The conclusion that inevitably followed was that McDonald's — and other likewise "Jewish" (sic) chains — had to be boycotted. As leftist trade unions and Jose Bové's Confederation of French Farmers have, with various pretexts and at various times, called for just such action, their campaign against the "American fast-food giant" was now invested with the aspect of a veritable "Jewish boycott." The comparison, it must be said, in light of the methods employed by the leftist groups — including vandalism, intimidation of customers, and the spreading of bizarre atrocity stories (one McDonald's manager was accused, for instance, of intentionally locking an employee in a freezer) — did not seem wholly inappropriate. As it happens, it was just days after the Barbès rally that the Israeli embassy in Paris went up in flames in a fire that the French authorities immediately called accidental — even though the Parisian police admitted nearly a week later to having not yet inspected the grounds.

European integration has been characterized by a gradual ethnicization of political life.

A poster displayed at an "anti-war" demonstration last October in Berlin provided a graphically condensed version of the same "theory" developed by the Barbès orator. On it was depicted a Big Mac with a dead baby in place of the hamburger meat, a bullet hole through its stomach. The words "Made in Israel" were written under the illustration.[10] A still more fevered expression of analogous phantasms, shorn even of the real pretext of the

[10] A photograph of the poster can be viewed at http://www.dki.antifa.net/foto/20021026/index.html.

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Middle East conflict, was recently observable on the streets of Paris in the form of a sticker featuring the phrase "*Sida sans frontières*" ("AIDS without Borders"). This is a play on the formula adopted by various NGOs, such as "Doctors without Borders" or "Reporters without Borders." Above the phrase were three symbols: a dollar sign, a star of David, and a hammer and sickle. Thus, apparently America and Jews are supposed somehow to be responsible for the global AIDS crisis. One could hardly imagine a more extreme, or more convoluted, vehicle of demonization. The bizarre addition of the hammer and sickle ominously recalls Nazi propaganda, which alternately — or indeed seemingly all at once — made Jews the purveyors of "Anglo-Saxon" mercantile interests and of Bolshevism. Here the hammer and sickle was presumably meant to connote Communist China, which by virtue of recent reports of its own struggles with the AIDS virus is seemingly supposed to form part of the AIDS-spreading global syndicate. In lieu of the "Judeo-Bolshevik-Anglo-Saxon" conspiracy of yore, we have an apparently "Judeo-Sino-American" conspiracy of today.

A "law of ethnic groups"

THERE IS ONE final regard in which Habsburg's comments are especially representative of a more general feature of contemporary European politics, one which may in fact hold the key to the entire problem of anti-Semitism in Europe. Although the American public has remained almost entirely in the dark about this, the process of European integration has been characterized by a gradual, so to speak, "ethnicization" of political discourse and political life in the countries belonging to the European Union or which are expected to join in the near future. The introduction of "ethnic groups" as virtual actors in political life has taken place largely under the innocuous-sounding covers of "regionalism" and "minority rights." The traditional states of Europe are supposed to be inhabited, apart from the members of their "majority" nations, by those of any number of other "nationalities" or "national minorities," each reputedly concentrated in regions to which they are "autochthonous" and some being in principle just "branches" of the "majority" nation of a neighboring state. As they are evidently not constituted by political membership in the state — or, in other words, by the *citizenship* of their countries of residence, which the putative members of these "national minorities" in any case hold — such "nationalities" must, then, be conceived in "ethnic" terms, that is, as being constituted by real or imagined commonalities of "culture" and ancestry. The project of developing a "law of ethnic groups" (in German, "*Volksgruppenrecht*"), as championed by NGOs such as the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN), is meant to provide a legal framework taking appropriate account of this supposedly at once ethnological and political fact, if necessary by relativizing or even amending the structures and

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borders of existing states. Proposals emanating from the FUEN and kindred organizations have already influenced the development of European norms as embodied in documents like the European Charter on Minority and Regional Languages and the Framework Convention on Minority Rights.

In the past decade, the Balkans have served as a kind of laboratory for the "law of ethnic groups." Largely through the "good offices" of the Council of Europe, systems of government have been devised and are in the process of being implemented that compel parliamentarians and government officials to act, in effect, as the guardians of the interests of their putative "ethnicities." Ethnic Croat officials in Bosnia are thus supposed to represent "Croat interests," or ethnic Albanian officials in Macedonia "Albanian interests," and so on. The so-called Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus, devised in consultation with European officials and incorporating existing European norms in anticipation of Cyprus's accession to the EU, exhibits analogous features. While it promises the administrative "reunification" of the island, it would in fact guarantee a permanent spatial and institutional segregation of the island's residents within their respective ethnic "communities." A European politician no less influential than Peter Glotz, who was the German representative to Valery Giscard d'Estaing's "Constitutional Convention" for much of its existence, has not hesitated to propose forms of ethnic-national representation as an appropriate substitute for the principle of "one man-one vote" throughout Europe. Not coincidentally, the Social Democrat Glotz is, along with Otto von Habsburg, one of the founding members of another influential ethnicist think tank, the Munich-based International Institute for Ethnic-Group Rights and Regionalism (INTEREG). The racist dementia reflected in Otto von Habsburg's supposition that Paul Wolfowitz represents Jews or Condoleezza Rice represents "blacks" is, in short, a dementia with which Europe as a whole is increasingly afflicted — so severely that it is attempting to translate its affliction into political practice.

The Balkans have served as a kind of laboratory for the "law of ethnic groups."

What has this to do with Europe's recent Jewish problems? Well, everything here hinges on the notion of "autochthoneity." As noted, according to the advocates of a Europe of regions and ethnicities, a European nation or nationality must be "autochthonous" — meaning presumably that members of it have lived on the European continent for a very, very long time — and be concentrated (i.e., its members must be concentrated) in some "relatively well-demarcated traditional area of settlement." Jews obviously, at least as they are usually viewed, meet neither of these criteria. In the terminology of the "law of ethnic groups," they are not "autochthonous" but rather "allochthonous" or, more simply put, *foreign*. The same goes for the members of more recent immigrant groups, such as Turks or Algerians, who, inas-

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much as they are "allochthons," are likewise conspicuously excluded from the protections laid down by the European conventions on "minority rights."

On May 12 of last year, as a group of 15 young *beurs* assaulted five Jewish teenagers on a soccer field in the Val de Marne near Paris, they are reported to have shouted the following insults: "Dirty Jews! Go back to your country! You're not in your land!" Apparently unconsciously, the North African youth expressed what is becoming a most European point of view. Nor were they cognizant, it seems, of how easily their words could be turned against them. Indeed, whereas in 2002 most of the targets of racist violence in France were Jewish, most of the non-Jewish targets were North African or Arab. Contrary, however, to what one would be led to believe by the standard leftist vision of European racism, relatively few of the "anti-Muslim" attacks occurred on continental French territory and even fewer were attributable to the so-called extreme right (e.g., supporters of the National Front or its splinter parties). Fully 61 percent of the reported "anti-Muslim" attacks (45 out of 74 incidents, according to the statistics published by the CNCDH) occurred on the little island of Corsica, where slogans like "Corsica for the Corsicans" and "Arabs get out" — as well as "French get out," for that matter — have wide currency as graffiti and in political pamphlets. Corsican nationalist groups explicitly claimed responsibility for many of the attacks.

This is highly significant, for the greatest "beneficiaries" of the new ethnically inflected European "regionalism" in the French context have been precisely the Corsican nationalists. With the tacit support of the European institutions and the more conspicuous support of the French Greens, Corsican nationalists have been able to win concessions from the central government on devolving powers to local institutions as well as legal recognition of the island's "cultural specificity" (though it is by no means obvious, as the outcome of the recent referendum in Corsica illustrates, that a majority of the island's population supports either of these goals). Judging by the words and deeds of the nationalists, the preservation of such "cultural specificity" excludes the assimilation of "allochthons." A recent "anti-Muslim" tract that circulated in Corsica referred to the "incompatibility of two communities that everything separates living together on the same land." An earlier tract warned that "non-indigenous persons [*les allogènes*] should know that this land will never belong to them."

The danger for European Jews

EUROPEAN "REGIONALISM" and the "law of ethnic groups" represent a threat to Jews. They convert an individual's "Jewishness" from a private matter of personal history (or, indeed, pre-history) into a matter of public interest. The fine-grained ethnic survey of Europe's national populations recently co-authored by former FUEN president (and

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current director of the South Tirolean Ethnic Group Institute) Christoph Pan makes this perfectly clear.[11] As a result of this sort of exercise, "Jews" are set apart from the populations among which they live as being somehow significantly different and furthermore, to the extent that they are "allochthonous," as "not belonging."

All of this amounts, in effect, to a renaissance of the "blood and soil" ideology whose disastrous consequences for Jews and other "non-indigenous" persons in Europe in the past century are well enough known. Indeed, in Greek mythology, the "autochthons" are literally those who spring directly from the soil. Not surprisingly, some of the pioneers of a European "law of ethnic groups" in the 1930s were Nazi legal theorists. Several of them were successfully rehabilitated after the war and substantially contributed to the founding of the FUEN and the INTEREG.[12] To take but one example, Theodor Veiter, the longtime editor of the FUEN organ *Europa Ethnica*, wrote in a 1938 study on "national autonomy" that "The destructive questioning of the highest human values . . . by Jewry shows that Jews are already excluded from the ethnic-national life of other nations by virtue of their mode of thought, which flows precisely from their race, and that they should therefore be excluded from the other nations."

The dangers represented by a resurgent ethnicist or ethnic-national ideology for Jews in Europe are especially grave in light of the simultaneous resurgence, under the banner of "anti-globalization," of a vaguely "leftist" ideology that stigmatizes cosmopolitanism — that traditional marker of the "uprooted," "wandering" Jew in the anti-Semitic *Weltanschauung* — and blames the "anonymous power" of financial markets — that most important channel of supposed "Jewish influence" according to the same — for much of the world's problems. This is not to say, of course, that every criticism of the functioning of financial markets or of free trade is automatically to be regarded as anti-Semitic. But it is to say that given the historical affinities between the critique of economic liberalism and traditional anti-Semitism, and given the highly under-theorized, largely "spontaneous" character of the anti-globalization movement, it is not surprising that classical anti-Semitic stereotypes will frequently fill the intellectual void and endow the ubiquitous but dimly perceived "capitalist" enemy with a well-known "ethnic" incarnation. It is not for nothing, after all, that August Bebel described anti-Semitism already in the nineteenth century as the "socialism of fools."

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[11]Christoph Pan and Beate Sibylle Pfeil, *Die Volksgruppen in Europa: Ein Handbuch* (Vienna: Braunmüller, 2000).

[12]For details, see Walter von Goldendach, Hans-Rüdiger Minow, and Martin Rudig, *Von Krieg zu Krieg* (Berlin: Verlag 8. Mai, 1996).

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Religious Faith and Charitable Giving

By ARTHUR C. BROOKS

> *There is a time when a Christian must sell all and give to the poor, as they did in the Apostles times. There is a time allsoe when Christians (though they give not all yet) must give beyond their abillity, as they of Macedonia, Cor. 2, 6. Likewise community of perills calls for extraordinary liberality, and soe doth community in some speciall service for the Churche. Lastly, when there is no other means whereby our Christian brother may be relieved in his distress, we must help him beyond our ability rather than tempt God in putting him upon help by miraculous or extraordinary meanes.*
>
> — John Winthrop, "A Modell of Christian Charity" (1630)

OVER THE PAST decade, a number of policy scholars have examined parallel bedrock constituencies in America's political parties. On one side, the Republicans rely on the near-monolithic support of Christian conservatives, a fact that has been documented ad nauseam by political commentators and the mainstream press for more than 20 years. Less well understood, but equally important, is the role of liberal secularists in shaping the policies of the American left. These people are the religious and political inverse of Christian conservatives: They vote for liberal politi-

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cal candidates and hold left-wing views on issues like school prayer and the death penalty. But most saliently, religion does not play a significant role in their lives. As political scientists Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio recently demonstrated in the *Public Interest* ("Our Secularist Democratic Party," Fall 2002), liberal secularists are at least as influential in molding the platform of the Democratic Party as are Christian conservatives for the Republicans.

Secularism is historically anomalous in the American cultural mainstream. The links between civic and religious life were persistent across the American political spectrum for hundreds of years. Indeed, John Winthrop's seventeenth-century statement quoted above would probably not have sounded particularly zealous throughout most of the twentieth century. As many public opinion scholars have documented, however, a dramatic philosophical shift occurred in the 1960s, leaving us to this day with a pervasive secular rhetoric on the political left. Consider how retrograde the words of John F. Kennedy's 1961 inaugural address would sound today: "With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own."

Secularism is historically anomalous in the American cultural mainstream.

An unanswered question is one of causality: Do secularists tend toward the political left, or do political liberals tend to be secular? On the one hand, secularism might be the only hard-headed option for those who see, as Karl Marx did, that "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions." On the other hand, secularists might find sanctuary in liberalism's tolerance for their somewhat unpopular views. Alexis de Tocqueville noted that being a secularist in America was no easy life (at least in 1835): "In the United States, if a politician attacks a sect, this may not prevent the partisans of that very sect from supporting him; but if he attacks all the sects together, everyone abandons him, and he remains alone." Nor is secularism a popular stance among the public at large today: According to a March 2002 survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, more than half of Americans have an unfavorable view of nonbelievers.

Reasonable people will disagree as to whether this animus owes to simple religious intolerance, or rather to behavioral differences between the groups. Perceived differences leading to hostility might include disproportionately high rates of behaviors discouraged by religious norms (for example, adultery) or low rates of virtuous actions encouraged by them (for example, charity).

This essay focuses on the latter. Using data from a large survey conducted in 2000, I investigate differences in charitable giving and volunteering

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between secular and religious people. I look for explanations for these differences in the current debates about social capital, the role of government in social policy, and the separation of church and state. Finally, I explore the implications of charitable giving differences for policy and politics.[1]

Giving and volunteering, by the numbers

How do religious and secular people vary in their charitable behavior? To answer this, I turn to data collected expressly to explore patterns in American civic life. The *Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey* (SCCBS) was undertaken in 2000 by researchers at universities throughout the United States and the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. The data consist of nearly 30,000 observations drawn from 50 communities across the United States and ask individuals about their "civic behavior," including their giving and volunteering during the year preceding the survey.

From these data, I have constructed two measures of religious participation. First, the group I refer to as "religious" are the respondents that report attending religious services every week or more often. This is 33 percent of the sample. Second, the group I call "secular" report attending religious services less than a few times per year or explicitly say they have no religion. These people are 26 percent of the sample (implying that those who practice their religion occasionally make up 41 percent of the sample). The SCCBS asked respondents whether and how much they gave and volunteered to "religious causes" or "non-religious charities" over the previous 12 months. Across the whole population, 81 percent gave, while 57 percent volunteered.

The differences in charity between secular and religious people are dramatic. Religious people are 25 percentage points more likely than secularists to donate money (91 percent to 66 percent) and 23 points more likely to volunteer time (67 percent to 44 percent). And, consistent with the findings of other writers, these data show that practicing a religion is more important than the actual religion itself in predicting charitable behavior. For example, among those who attend worship services regularly, 92 percent of Protestants give charitably, compared with 91 percent of Catholics, 91 percent of Jews, and 89 percent from other religions.

Socioeconomically, the religious and secular groups are similar in some ways and different in others. For example, there is little difference between the groups in income (both have average household incomes around $49,000) or education level (20 percent of each group holds a college

[1]For their helpful comments on this essay, I am grateful to Louis Bolce, Gerald De Maio, Jeff Straussman, and Scott Allard.

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degree). On the other hand, the secular group is disproportionately male (49 percent to 32 percent), unmarried (58 percent to 40 percent), and young (42 to 49 years old, on average). In addition, the SCCBS data show that religion and secularism break down on ideological lines: Religious people are 38 percentage points more likely to say they are conservative than to say they are liberal (57 percent to 19 percent). In contrast, secular people are 13 points more likely to say they are liberal than to say they are conservative (42 percent to 29 percent).

It is possible, of course, that the charity differences between secular and religious people are due to these nonreligious socioeconomic differences. To investigate this possibility, I used a statistical procedure called probit regression to examine the role of religious practice in isolation from all other relevant demographic characteristics: political beliefs, income (and hence, indirectly, the tax incentives for giving), education level, gender, age, race, marital status, and area of residence. The data show that if two people — one religious and the other secular — are identical in every other way, the secular person is 23 percentage points less likely to give than the religious person and 26 points less likely to volunteer.

Note that neither political ideology nor income is responsible for much of the charitable differences between secular and religious people. For example, religious liberals are 19 points more likely than secular liberals to give to charity, while religious conservatives are 28 points more likely than secular conservatives to do so. In other words, religious conservatives (who give and volunteer at rates of 91 percent and 67 percent) appear to differ from secular liberals (who give and volunteer at rates of 72 percent and 52 percent) more due to religion than to politics. Similarly, giving differences do not disappear when income is neutralized. This should not be particularly surprising, however, because the SCCBS data show practically no income differences between the groups. Furthermore, research on philanthropy has consistently shown that the poor tend to give *more* frequently — and a higher percentage of their incomes — than the middle class. For example, economist Charles Clotfelter and others have shown that the poor tend to give a proportion of their income to charity that is comparable to the giving proportion of the very wealthy — and nearly twice that of the middle class.[2] (This seems to be true only for the working poor, however. Welfare support appears to depress giving substantially.[3])

Charity differences between religious and secular people persist if we look at the actual amounts of donations and volunteering. Indeed, measures of the dollars given and occasions volunteered per year produce a yawning gap

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[2]Charles T. Clotfelter, *Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving* (University of Chicago Press, 1985).

[3]Arthur C. Brooks, "Welfare Receipt and Private Charity," *Public Budgeting and Finance* (Fall 2002).

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between the groups. The average annual giving among the religious is $2,210, whereas it is $642 among the secular. Similarly, religious people volunteer an average of 12 times per year, while secular people volunteer an average of 5.8 times. To put this into perspective, religious people are 33 percent of the population but make 52 percent of donations and 45 percent of times volunteered. Secular people are 26 percent of the population but contribute 13 percent of the dollars and 17 percent of the times volunteered.

These differences hardly change when we consider them in isolation from the other demographics, using a statistical technique called tobit regression. Religious practice by itself is associated with $1,388 more given per year than we would expect to see from a secular person (with the same political views, income, education, age, race, and other characteristics), as well as with 6.5 more occasions of volunteering.

Neither ideology nor income is responsible for the charitable differences between secular and religious people.

Some people might object to my conflation here of religious and nonreligious charity. One might argue, for example, that religious charity is more likely to take place for non-altruistic reasons than is nonreligious giving and volunteering: Religious people might give because of social pressure, for personal gain (such as stashing away rewards in Heaven), or to finance the services that they themselves consume, such as sacramental activities. Therefore, disparities in charity might disappear when we only consider explicitly nonreligious giving and volunteering. The SCCBS data do not support this hypothesis, however: Religious people are more generous than secular people with *non*religious causes as well as with religious ones. While 68 percent of the total population gives (and 51 percent volunteers) to nonreligious causes each year, religious people are 10 points more likely to give to these causes than secularists (71 percent to 61 percent) and 21 points more likely to volunteer (60 percent to 39 percent). For example, religious people are 7 points more likely than secularists to volunteer for neighborhood and civic groups, 20 points more likely to volunteer to help the poor or elderly, and 26 points more likely to volunteer for school or youth programs. It seems fair to say that religion engenders charity in general — including nonreligious charity.

One might also posit that informal giving (say, to family and friends) by secularists could offset charity to established causes by religious people. My own research, however, makes this look improbable. Using 1999 data on individuals from the Bureau of Labor Standards, I found that, for most people, formal and informal charity are not substitutes for each other. On the contrary, people who give formally are 21 percentage points more likely

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than those who do not to also give informally. That is, informal giving does not explain the underlying discrepancy; it *compounds* it.[4]

Charity, religion, and the state

How can we explain the dramatic charitable differences between secular and religious people? Two lines of reasoning tie the findings above to current policy debates. First, secularists may prefer government solutions to social problems over private (charity-supported) ones, and thus give and volunteer less than religious people. Second, religion may be a key ingredient in promoting social capital, which in turn encourages giving and volunteering.

Secularists are distinct from religious people in their view on the government's role in providing social welfare. According to the National Opinion Research Center's 1996 *General Social Survey*, secularists support greater public spending for social programs — even if it means higher taxation — at slightly higher rates than religious people do. This support might logically correspond with disfavor for private, charitable *alternatives* to public-sector social welfare provision. To understand why, consider the attitudes evident in this recent passage from the opinion magazine the *Nation*: "A program that deals with drug addiction as sinful behavior curable through Bible classes — and much touted by the supporters of faith-based approaches to social problems . . . actually costs more to deliver than conventional drug treatment."[5] Obviously, the religious person interested in the spiritual needs of a drug addict as well as his or her physical problems will see the efficacy of a faith-based drug rehabilitation program (and hence the need for private charity to the program) differently than the secular person who is interested only in the non-faith outcomes. In effect, neither party is necessarily *incorrect*. The secularist views fostering the faith of a drug addict as a waste of resources, while the religious person sees it as essential to true rehabilitation. It is hardly surprising that the faith-based approach to combating addiction costs more: It has a bigger task to accomplish. Consequently, the secularist may find a mechanism that does not subsidize any spirituality, such as a government program, to be more effective than a solution based on private giving.

To be more precise, secularist support for government social spending would probably not extend all the way to the use of tax revenues to subsidize social services by faith-based organizations. Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation between church and state" is a popular metaphor invoked in con-

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[4]Arthur C. Brooks, "The Effects of Public Policy on Private Charity," *Administration & Society* (forthcoming in 2004).

[5]Gara LaMarche, "Compassionate Aversionism," *Nation* (April 19, 2001).

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stitutional arguments against phenomena such as private-school vouchers or the White House's Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. Notwithstanding Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist's comment on this very metaphor (in his 1985 dissent in *Wallace v. Jaffree*) that "[i]t is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history," Jefferson's "wall" remains fairly sacrosanct in secular ideology. Justice Rehnquist and other scholars believe that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has been twisted by secularists to prevent all links between government and religion instead of simply preventing the preferential treatment of certain religions. The framers did not, according to Rehnquist, see the First Amendment as "requiring neutrality between religion and irreligion."

Some scholars have gone so far as to assert that separationism has an unseemly past in which bigoted groups throughout history have employed it simply to restrict the role of unfavored religious groups in public life. In his *Separation of Church and State* (Harvard University Press, 2002), University of Chicago law professor Philip Hamburger, for example, documents the strict invocation of the Establishment Clause by nativist Protestants in the nineteenth century to limit the freedoms of immigrant Catholics. He finds this analogous to the current constitutional arguments by secularists who are hostile to organized religion per se. Judge Robert Bork, writing in the *Public Interest* ("Getting Over the Wall," Fall 2002), blames this prejudice-based use of the First Amendment for what he labels "the current madness, in which it is held to be a forbidden establishment of religion if a student is offended by hearing others say 'under God' as part of the pledge of allegiance."

The framers did not see the First Amendment as "requiring neutrality between religion and irreligion."

A key distinction in secular versus religious support for social programs, therefore, is between private charity and tax support for *nonreligious* public programs, which have proliferated contemporaneously with the rise of secularism. It would be unreasonable to deny the many important advances that the expansion of these programs has stimulated over the past 35 years, from establishing greater civil rights to alleviating indigence among the elderly. On the other hand, the unintended side effects of some government social programs — such as lowering incentives to find market work or avoid births out of wedlock — have become a staple in the neoconservative diet. In the words of Irving Kristol, writing in the *Wall Street Journal* (June 14, 1993), "The problem with our current welfare programs is not that they are costly — which they are — but that they have such perverse consequences for people they are supposed to benefit."

Decreases in private charity might represent a similar perverse conse-

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quence of secularists' embrace of government spending: A belief in the superiority of nonreligious public funding over private support for social causes might logically discourage one's own private giving and volunteering. Will I tend to give and volunteer to feed the hungry if I believe the government *should* be paying for these services, I pay my taxes, and I favor higher taxes still? Perhaps not. And if charitable behavior is habitual (which researchers believe it is), this belief could bleed over into areas in which government funding is not even a realistic alternative. For example, once there is no "culture of giving" in my household, I might be less likely to feel an obligation to volunteer for local civic organizations. Harvard's Robert Putnam, in the January 1995 article in the *Journal of Democracy* that became the basis for *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (Simon & Schuster, 2000), cites parent-teacher associations (PTAs) as an example of the kind of organization that suffers in a society in which charitable, civic involvement is declining: "The [PTA] has been an especially important form of civic engagement in twentieth-century America. . . . It is, therefore, dismaying to discover that participation in parent-teacher organizations has dropped drastically over the last generation."

What fosters the community sentiments that lead to the civic behavior that is so indispensable in governing ourselves?

Participation in the PTA might seem trivial, but as Putnam and others believe, its falling fortunes are symptomatic of a deeper problem: a decrease in "social capital," the stock of trust and social cohesiveness that promotes giving, volunteering, and participation in civil society. Social capital is generally accumulated as part of nonmarket, nonstate interactions between individuals. While difficult to pin down and measure in the way we might measure, say, human or financial capital, its proponents ascribe tremendous importance to it in ensuring a vital society. In the words of Francis Fukuyama, "Social capital is important to the efficient functioning of modern economies, and is the *sine qua non* of stable liberal democracy."[6] This statement is fully in line with the writing of Tocqueville, who believed that American voluntary associations (and by extension, we might imagine, financial support of voluntary activities) were the bridge between dehumanizing individualism and a strong, cohesive, democratic population.

What fosters the community sentiments that lead to the civic behavior that is so indispensable in governing ourselves? In *Habits of the Heart:*

[6]Francis Fukuyama, "Social Capital and Civil Society" (International Monetary Fund, 2000).

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Individualism and Commitment in American Life (University of California Press, 1985), sociologist Robert Bellah and his co-authors assert that "religion provides a conception, even if rudimentary, of how one should live . . . one's obligation to God involves one's life at work as well as in the family, what one does as a citizen as well as how one treats one's friends." That is, secularism, in addition to stimulating enthusiasm for government as an alternative to civil society, may be antithetical to civil society's key ingredient.

Charity and political parties

RECENT SCHOLARSHIP has demonstrated the disproportionate influence the secular left has over the modern Democratic Party. My research establishes a link between secular views and strikingly low levels of charitable giving and volunteering. While differences in charitable behavior are not particularly apparent between left and right per se, my findings do suggest that, if secularists play an increasing role in the *direction* of the Democratic Party, indifference (or even hostility) to private charity will probably rise within that party.

If this prediction seems hyperbolic, one should only look at the nations of Western Europe, often considered the ideological models for the American left, and in which religious practice and charity levels are generally far lower than those in America. Take Spain as an example: As this traditionally Catholic country ran full tilt toward socialism starting in 1982, the concomitant attitude of the Spanish governments toward organized religion and private philanthropy became unsympathetic. Charities and churches were viewed as usurping centralized power in social welfare and, even worse, as devolving funding decisions to individual (often wealthy, conservative) donors. The result was a tax system and other public policies that did not encourage private charity or a healthy nonprofit and voluntary sector. (The socialists were ultimately voted out of power by Jose María Aznar's center-right Popular Party, and Spanish tax law has recently become more accommodating to private charitable activity.) Today, the average Spaniard is 20 percentage points less likely than the average American to classify himself as "religious," gives less than half as much to charity, and volunteers about one-fifth as often.[7] And Spain has the *highest* level of charitable giving per capita in Western Europe (and has church attendance rates that are among the highest as well).

While many Spaniards would argue that current religious and charitable practices are a rebound legacy of the 40-year right-wing dictatorship of

[7]These data come from the 1998 International Social Survey Programme. See also Lester M. Salamon et al., *Global Civil Society*, (Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999).

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Francisco Franco, the fact is that Spanish rates are trending toward the rest of Western Europe, almost all of which has *not* so recently suffered under a dictator who imposed hardcore religious and social norms on the population. What Spain has most in common today with the rest of Europe is a tendency toward a leftist, secular outlook and — not coincidentally, it appears — a falling concern for religion and charity.

Whether this tendency is a virtue or a vice is a subjective matter. Progressive Europe holds the secular left viewpoint as a mark of distinction, often consciously placing it in counterpoint to America's supposed unsophistication. "Mr. and Mrs. Average [America] share an uncomplicated faith with its roots in the puritanism of their forebears," reported the BBC recently.[8] Similarly, Régis Debray (a former advisor to French President François Mitterand) wrote in the *New York Times* (February 23, 2003):

> Europe defends a secular vision of the world. It does not separate matters of urgency from long-term considerations. The United States compensates for its shortsightedness, its tendency to improvise, with an altogether biblical self-assurance in its transcendent destiny.

Notwithstanding the eloquence of Debray's obvious distaste for Americans in general, he uses inappropriately broad brush strokes in describing us. Indeed, approximately 70 million Americans can be classified as secularists along the lines that I have outlined here. Whether or not these people politically resemble our European friends more than the rest of America is a question for other writers. What we may conclude here, however, is that this group represents an exemplary model of European charity.

Perhaps it does not matter whether the Democrats become the party of "un-charity." The fight for political appeal may not depend on the perception that one party promotes individual sacrifice while the other does not. Popular support may only depend on tangible policies: the minimum wage, welfare reform, abortion rights, "faith-based initiatives," school vouchers, and a host of other issues that focus on how the government affects us as citizens, not how we voluntarily affect one another. This is an empirical question: Do we see our politics as a reflection of our values or simply as a means to leverage a set of policies favorable to our wishes?

On the other hand, a growing un-charity might bode ill for American progressive politics. In his *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899), Thorstein Veblen, the iconoclastic economist from the early twentieth century, wrote that the "residue of the religious life — the sense of communion with the environment, or with the generic life process — as well as the impulse of charity or of sociability, act in a pervasive way to shape men's habits of thought for the economic purpose." Tocqueville made roughly the same

[8]Justin Webb, "America's Deep Christian Faith," *BBC News World Edition* (March 14, 2003).

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point even more vividly in *Democracy in America* (1835): "Men are . . . immeasurably interested in acquiring fixed ideas of God, of the soul, and of their general duties to their Creator and their fellow men; for doubt on these first principles would abandon all their actions to chance and would condemn them in some way to disorder and impotence." Certainly, Tocqueville and Veblen are not alone in the belief that economic and cultural health are dependent on the related values of religion and charity. And it is not hard to imagine a growing popular distaste for a political wing distinguished by its lack of giving spirit and religious spirituality.

Some religious liberals — who currently give and volunteer at rates comparable to religious conservatives — may ultimately sense they face a choice between politics and charity, and many may choose the latter. (This danger is reminiscent of the well-documented Democratic hemorrhage of Catholic voters over the past 20 years, commonly attributed to the increasingly strict party line against pro-life viewpoints.) Indeed, the importance of charity to a religious lifestyle might be one "missing link" in explaining why fewer and fewer religious people have tended to classify themselves as Democrats over the past 30 years — from 37 percent in 1972, to 31 percent in 1983, to 25 percent in 1998.

While it appears inseparable from religion, charitable activity does not *inherently* privilege a particular political ideology. On the one hand, charity often functions as an alternative to "big government" or explicitly injects religious faith into social programs. On the other hand, as scholar Peter Frumkin notes in *On Being Nonprofit* (Harvard University Press, 2002), much charitable activity is harmonious with social advocacy and functions in partnership *with* government. Thus, it is not axiomatic that the increasing role of secularists in American progressive politics should necessarily drive charity — and hence charitable people — out of the Democratic Party. The key for Democrats is to focus on the ways in which faith-based charity and secular social agendas converge and to make peace with those who see a higher authority over man than the federal government or United Nations.

Learning to give, or not

THE PERSONAL characteristics that distinguish us from one another can be classified as socially exogenous (e.g., race, place of birth) or socially endogenous (e.g., political beliefs, marital status). Economist Glenn Loury argues that when we mistake the latter for the former, we tend to absolve ourselves of responsibility for a characteristic's ill-effects, leading to prejudice and improper public policy. For example, in *The Anatomy of Racial Inequality* (Harvard University Press, 2002), Loury argues that high crime rates associated with African Americans are the result of unhealthy race relations (which are socially endogenous) but are perceived by many whites as innate to blacks (socially exogenous), discouraging

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support for policies that seek to ameliorate these problems.

This line of reasoning may partially illuminate popular prejudice against secularists in America (assuming that some of this prejudice is due to a problematic lack of personal charity) and suggest solutions. On the one hand, the problem might seem exogenous: Faith and charity may be part and parcel of the same God-given impulse. In the words of the Koran, "O you who believe! when you consult the Apostle, then offer something in charity before your consultation; that is better for you and purer; but if you do not find, then surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful" (58.12).

On the other hand, the connection between religiosity and generosity might be more earth-bound: It might be that religion simply has a strong pedagogical (endogenous) influence over giving and volunteering. Houses of worship might teach their congregants the religious duty to give, and about both the physical and spiritual needs of the poor. Simply put, people may be more likely to learn charity inside a church, synagogue, or mosque than outside. If charity is indeed a learned behavior, it may be that houses of worship are only one means (albeit an especially efficacious one) to teach it. Secularists interested in increasing charitable giving and volunteering among their ranks might spend some effort thinking of alternative ways to foster these habits.

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Taking Proliferation Seriously

By HENRY SOKOLSKI

WITH AMERICA'S departure from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty late in 2002, Bush officials have claimed that America has begun to lead the world away from security policies based on mutual assured destruction (MAD). The administration's decision to deploy a national missile defense system in Alaska certainly is a clear refutation of MAD-based opposition to such protection. What's less clear, however, is how America's

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rejection of MAD might affect U.S. nuclear weapons policies beyond missile defense — specifically, America's plans to stem the spread of nuclear weapons or to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances.

MAD and NPT

TO AN EXTENT not generally appreciated, U.S. and international nonproliferation policies have had a fairly tight relation to MAD. During the Cold War, the most popular view concerning nuclear weapons reflected the MAD view that having a nuclear force capable of killing large numbers of civilians afforded nations basic security against attack. There also was a MAD fear that any attempt by nations to go beyond the finite force levels needed to attack undefended cities would lead to war-prone arms races.

The thinking here was that if the superpowers targeted more than their opponents' vulnerable cities, they would be forced to develop ever-quicker, more accurate nuclear delivery systems (necessary to evade or destroy opposing weapons). They also would have to place their weapons on hair-trigger alert and risk deploying them tactically to an ever-growing number of military commanders. All of this, it was argued, would only increase the chances of nuclear war.[1]

These views certainly were common during the mid-1960s and were quite prevalent among those negotiating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Thus, by the late 1960s, most of those crafting the NPT argued that the real proliferation danger emanated not so much from the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations as from as the superpowers' own never-ending arms race. This rivalry, these diplomats argued, was even more likely to result in worldwide destruction than smaller states' "independent manufacture" of nuclear weapons.[2] They agreed that all nations had a *right* to acquire nuclear weapons to defend themselves (not only against possible nuclear neighbors, but as a hedge against the superpowers if they refused to curb their own nuclear arming). But if "because of higher considerations of the interests of mankind" non-weapons states decided not to exercise this

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[1]See, e.g., National Planning Association, *1970 Without Arms Control* (May 1958); Howard Simons, "World-Wide Capabilities for Production and Control of Nuclear Weapons," *Daedalus* (Summer 1959); and William C. Davidson, Marvin I. Kalkstein, and Christophe Hohenemeser, *The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control* (National Planning Association, January 1960).

[2]See, e.g., "Statement by the Indian Representative [Trivedi] to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 31, 1966," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1966* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 679.

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right, they were equally convinced that these states deserved to be compensated.[3]

Under the NPT, this compensation consisted of: (1) non-weapons states having an "inalienable right" to acquire all forms of nuclear energy technology (Article IV); (2) the demand that the superpowers engage in good faith negotiations on "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race" (Article VI); and (3) the right of non-weapons states to withdraw from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons "if extraordinary events . . . have jeopardized the[ir] supreme interests" (Article X).

For nearly 30 years, this "grand bargain" was interpreted in a manner that focused greatest attention on the need for the superpowers to end the arms race — i.e., to stop nuclear innovation through nuclear testing and to reduce the size of their arsenals to levels (a few hundred weapons) no larger than needed to absorb an attack and yet be able to target other countries' undefended cities. Thus, the NPT's preamble calls for "the cessation of the arms race" and of further nuclear weapons production and testing. The treaty's negotiating record, meanwhile, speaks approvingly of restraints on national missile defenses (later to become the ABM Treaty) and on nuclear missile delivery systems (later to become SALT and START). As such, the various NPT review conferences that have been held on almost an annual basis since the NPT came into force have focused on these issues almost exclusively.

States have pushed for ever-freer access to civilian nuclear energy technology.

Finally, throughout the past three decades, members of the NPT have pushed for ever-freer access to civilian nuclear energy technology. The view here has been almost identical to that voiced at the time of the NPT's signing: If a state forswears exercising its right to acquire nuclear weapons, it nonetheless retains a natural right to all forms of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Exercise of this residual right has been interpreted to include acquiring the ability to stockpile large quantities of nuclear weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium and even to develop nuclear weapons implosion and gun assembly devices (so long as these don't have nuclear weapons material cores).

All that was required of non-weapons states to engage in these activities, besides signing the NPT, was to afford NPT's nuclear watchdog agency or its equivalent in EURATOM occasional access to monitor declared nuclear facili-

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[3]See, e.g., "Statement by the Brazilian Representative [Azeredo da Silveira] to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, August 31, 1967," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1967* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 370.

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ties to ensure that no special nuclear material was unaccounted for. If a nation's amount of special nuclear material (including even large amounts of nuclear weapons-usable material) was what it should be, the IAEA would issue a clean bill of health and protect whatever it knew about the amounts of these nuclear weapons-usable materials from being sought or shared.[4] Thus, it was understood that, consistent with the treaty, members of the NPT could develop a nuclear weapons breakout capability. As the U.S. State Department's own Policy Planning staff explained in an internal study in 1968:

> After the NPT, many nations can be expected to take advantage of the terms of the treaty to produce quantities of fissionable material. Plutonium separation plants will be built; fast breeder reactors developed. It is possible that experimentation with conventional explosives that might be relevant to detonating a nuclear bomb core may take place. In this way, various nations will attain a well-developed option on a bomb. A number of nations will be able to detonate a bomb within a year following withdrawal from the treaty; others may even shorten this period.[5]

Under this interpretation of the NPT, adherence to the treaty required only minimal enforcement or monitoring. The key protection against proliferation, after all, was the willingness of nations to forswear exercising their natural right to acquire nuclear weapons in a legally binding treaty. This also meant that the nonproliferation secured by the treaty was potentially quite fragile.

NPT after the Cold War

Despite these shortcomings, the NPT until recently was heralded as a clear success. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, achievement of the NPT's ultimate goals actually seemed within reach. South Africa and Ukraine

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[4]See, e.g., "Statement by the Dutch Representative [Eschauzier] to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extract], May 6, 1968," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1968* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 295-96; and "Statement by ACDA Director Forster to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, November 9, 1966," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1966* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 271.

[5]See U.S. Department of State Policy Planning Council, "After NPT, What?" NSF, Box 26, LBJL (May 25, 1968), as cited in Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (Columbia University Press, 1998), 299.

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renounced their possession of nuclear weapons and joined the NPT. Similarly, Brazil and Argentina gave up their nuclear weapons programs and became NPT members. In 1995, the NPT, which was up for a 25-year review, was extended indefinitely. Also, Russia and the United States began to reduce their deployment of nuclear weapons systems dramatically. By 2001, both had agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons deployments to less than 4,400 weapons, whereas at the height of the Cold War both had deployed a total of well over 60,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

After the mid-1990s, though, the NPT and its MAD-inspired interpretation began to falter. First, whatever limited utility MAD thinking may have had to describe or channel the Cold War competition between the Soviet and U.S.-led alliances, it was a tolerable view only so long as the two superpowers actively kept nations under their influence from acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. During the Cold War, to a great extent, this worked. The Soviets kept Eastern Europe from going nuclear, and the U.S. and NATO curbed the nuclear ambitions of most of Western Europe and much of the Middle East and Asia.

Both nations affirmed that they felt more secure with bombs of their own than they did with any support from others.

With the end of the Cold War competition, though, nations had a greater incentive to go their own way and MAD and finite deterrence arguments only tended to make this impulse stronger. Indeed, if acquisition of a relatively few nuclear weapons targeted against an adversary's undefended cities was a sure guarantee against being attacked by a neighbor or a larger outside power, why wouldn't most nations choose to go nuclear? In 1998, India and Pakistan's nuclear tests seemed to validate this view. Both nations essentially affirmed that they felt more secure with bombs of their own than they did with any military, political, or economic support they might get from others.

Second, after the Cold War several NPT members exploited the generous nuclear compensation that a MAD-inspired view of the NPT required. North Korea, which became a member of the NPT in 1985, managed to secure all the nuclear assistance it needed to generate and separate plutonium for bombs and launch a covert uranium enrichment program. Although it only allowed the IAEA to inspect its facilities in 1992, Pyongyang was able to remain a member of the NPT even *after* it was found in violation of its safeguards agreement in 1993 and, indeed, even after it first claimed it had already withdrawn in early 2003.

Iran, meanwhile, acquired virtually the entire fuel cycle — fuel fabrication plants, uranium enrichment facilities, a large light water reactor, a heavy

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water production facility — *without* being found in violation of either the NPT or its IAEA safeguards agreement. The concern now is that Tehran in little more than 30 months could come within weeks of having a nuclear arsenal of 50-75 weapons and still be a member of the NPT in good standing.

Third, after the Cold War, enforcement of the NPT was tested and found wanting. In the case of Iraq, it was only after its defeat in Desert Storm that the U.N. voted to restrict its full access to nuclear energy technology. At no time prior to the war was it ever found in violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations. North Korea, meanwhile, was able to evade the NPT requirement that it permit IAEA inspections of its facilities 18 months after signature and did so for nearly an additional five years with no repercussions. Then, when the U.N. in 1993 did finally find North Korea to be in violation of its safeguards agreement, no action was taken.

Rather than sanction North Korea, the U.S., its allies, and the U.N. allowed Pyongyang to evade its NPT obligation to allow IAEA inspectors for yet another decade. The reason was a U.S.-formulated deal to give North Korea two large, modern light water reactors in exchange for its *eventual* compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement. Even after Pyongyang made it clear that it had violated this agreement and withdrew from the NPT, no enforcement action was taken against it. The promised reactors are still being built.

North Korean officials recently suggested that they might export the nuclear weapons they had made to other states. As a state that has withdrawn from the NPT, this would be a perfectly legal thing for North Korea to do. It could even export warheads to an NPT non-weapons state member: So long as the warheads remained under North Korean control — as the U.S. currently maintains control of its nuclear weapons in Germany — no provision of the NPT would be violated.

What's MAD that remains

GIVEN THIS WORRISOME review of the NPT's current implementation, one can only hope that the popularity of MAD-inspired views of the treaty might finally give way to a safer set of policies. This is conceivable, but only if the U.S. and its allies are willing to drop their attachment to MAD thinking and MAD-inspired nonproliferation — steps that will require much more than the U.S. merely backing out of the ABM Treaty.

First, the U.S. and its allies would have to further reduce their security reliance on forms of nuclear retaliation that still entail the killing of large numbers of people. American officials are now openly raising doubts about the deterrent value of our nuclear forces against rogue states and terrorist organizations. Yet they still claim that retention of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed nuclear weapons is needed to deter "mature" or "advanced" states

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(e.g., Russia and China). Use of large numbers of these weapons to target Russia's weapons capabilities, however, could kill several million civilians. How well retaining such an "option" accords with moving away from MAD is unclear.

Also, the threatened use of such weapons is presented publicly as a possible means to deal with smaller, badly behaving states (i.e., those that might threaten use of chemical or biological weapons). American officials are particularly interested in being able to surgically disarm hostile states with nuclear bunker buster warheads. Yet many command bunkers are located in or near these states' largest cities (e.g., Baghdad, Tehran, etc.) as are a fair number of the weapons of mass destruction storage and production facilities that might be targeted. Attacking these targets could easily entail the slaughter of large numbers of people.

It is not clear what can be done about this. Perhaps non-nuclear technologies, such as kinetic ballistic missile warheads, could be developed to put hardened bunkers at risk. Perhaps targets could be selected that would keep potential collateral damage to a minimum or that would obviate the need to destroy the bunkers in question. Perhaps not. What is clear, however, is that relying heavily on nuclear targeting that entails heavy casualties will undermine the credibility of U.S. efforts to move away from MAD and to get other nations to do so as well.

Second, the U.S. and its allies would have to actively contest the notion that all states have a natural right to acquire nuclear weapons. Certainly, the notion that if a nation's security is threatened, it has a right to break out of the NPT needs to be challenged. If it is not, North Korea's recent accumulation of nuclear technology under false "peaceful" pretenses and its withdrawal from the treaty is sure to be only the first of many such frauds. Any credible challenge to similar abrogations, however, would require the U.S. and its allies to take a much firmer line against states outside the NPT's five recognized nuclear weapons powers. This would require discipline that has yet to be demonstrated.

In fact, the United States and its allies have all too frequently done the opposite, excusing Israel's, India's, and Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons as being "understandable." Recently, the chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission visited two of India's nuclear weapons production reactors and extended American nuclear "safety" cooperation to New Delhi. Earlier, the U.S. government did all it could to waive and bend mandatory sanctions laws directed against India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998.[6] More recently, the U.S. refused to identify Pakistan as a nuclear proliferator despite repeated reports of Pakistani nuclear assistance to North Korea and Iran. As for Israel, the U.S. did far too little to stop its

[6]See Mark Hibbs, "U.S. Confirms It Has Intelligence Pointing to DAE Planning Arms Tests," *NuclearFuel* (April 14, 2003).

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nuclear weapons program and has done nothing publicly to get it to stop production of plutonium at its weapons plant at Dimona.

Such proliferation "realism" is not limited to friendly nuclear weapons states outside the NPT. Nor is it confined to how the U.S. relates to friendly non-weapon state members of the NPT. The U.S. has protested North Korea's violation of the NPT and is seeking a resolution condemning it. It has protested little or not at all, however, Pyongyang's actual withdrawal from the treaty. Is the supposition here that the U.S. recognizes North Korea's right to nuclear weapons and its right to keep all the nuclear technology it illicitly gained while a member of the NPT?

Does the U.S. recognize North Korea's right to nuclear weapons?

Then there is the argument U.S. officials make that if North Korea does not disarm, Japan might acquire nuclear weapons as well. This is something China should fear, American officials have explained, but is it also something Washington welcomes or expects? Perhaps the United States could "live" with such a good nation acquiring nuclear weapons so long as Japan acquires them to assure mutual deterrence of North Korea. Is the U.S. ready to make the best of such proliferation? Is it prepared to let other friends — South Korea, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey — follow suit?

Again, if the U.S. is truly to move away from MAD, it must eschew even indirectly endorsing the notion that nuclear weapons can assure a nation protection from attack or that, as such, others' acquisition of them is simply the exercise of their right to self-defense. Certainly, if nations perceive that the U.S. is willing to look the other way or to endorse some nuclear proliferation as good, inevitable, or manageable, further proliferation will only be more likely.

Third, the U.S. and its allies would actually have to enforce the current set of nuclear nonproliferation rules and make them less generous with regard to what is safe and dangerous. As noted before, the MAD or finite deterrence-inspired notion that states have a right to nuclear weapons and that they should be compensated with free access to all types of nuclear technology for not exercising this right has more than run its course in the case of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The NPT, after all, makes it clear in Article IV that nations' inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must nonetheless be exercised "in conformity with Articles I and II," which prohibits states from assisting non-weapons states "in any way" to acquire nuclear explosives or control over such weapons.

This Article I and II prohibition, it should be noted, was originally inspired not by the finite deterrence or MAD thinking of the late 1960s, but by the original Irish U.N. Resolutions of 1958 and 1959, which were the first to call for an international nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In requesting

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that the U.N. establish a committee to study the dangers inherent in the further spread of nuclear weapons, the Irish representative to the U.N. held no brief for nations having any "right" to acquire atomic explosives, much less for them being compensated with unrestricted access to nuclear technology for "peaceful" purposes. Nor did he argue that the key nuclear threat was the pace of superpower nuclear weapons innovation or growth.

Instead, Ireland's original call for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty was premised on the fear that the further spread of nuclear weapons to additional states would make nuclear disarmament and reductions less likely and accidental or catalytic wars — ones instigated by smaller powers to draw the superpowers to their defense — more probable. Against this threat, the Irish representative urged adoption of the most basic restraint: States that had weapons should agree not to share or spread them, and states that lacked them should agree not to acquire them. As for the sharing of nuclear technology for civilian purposes, the Irish recognized that the further spread of such civilian capabilities would actually make the spread of nuclear weapons more likely and that, therefore, the proliferation of such technology had to be controlled. Finally, the Irish downplayed the idea that the superpowers had to disarm themselves before any progress could be made to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons to other states.[7]

The U.S. must reject the notion that nuclear weapons can protect a nation from attack.

Clearly, this original Irish Resolution view of the NPT is the one to which we need to return if we are to keep the NPT as an agreement that will reduce rather than fan further nuclear proliferation. In the first instance this will require that the U.S. and other nuclear technology-exporting states recognize that too much of what they are willing to share is too close to bombmaking to be safeguarded against quick diversion to military ends. Certainly, light water reactors in Iran will bring it dangerously close to having a large arsenal of near-weapons-grade plutonium after only 15 months of operation. The same is true of North Korea if either of the two light water reactors the U.S., Japan, and South Korea are helping to build are completed. It is even clearer that Russia's, Pakistan's, and China's sharing of fuel fabrication, plutonium separation, and uranium enrichment technology and hardware with Iran and North Korea is simply too close to bombmaking ever to allow for any monitoring to be able to afford timely warning of a possible military diversion.

Unfortunately, America is still pushing international cooperation on

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[7]For documentation of these points, see Henry Sokolski, *Best of Intentions: America's Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation* (Praeger Publishers, 2001), 39-56.

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advanced fuel cycles and reactors that includes cooperation on "proliferation resistant" breeder reactors and reprocessing (because of the addition of several steps that could just as easily be subtracted as not). This cooperation is being proposed for Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Argentina — states that only recently gave up nuclear weapons programs of their own.

Finally, there seems to be growing U.S. and allied indifference to further civilian use of weapons-usable plutonium. Here the U.S. is proposing to reconsider President Ford's policy of deferring the commercial use of such nuclear fuels. As an unannounced lead in this effort, Washington is plowing ahead with its efforts to convert 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) civilian fuels over the next 20 years and to help pay Russia to do the same. The U.S. Department of Energy claims that this effort has nothing to do with reversing the Ford policies — but, in fact, this project will result in over $6 billion in MOX fuel fabrication facilities being built both here and in Russia and the movement of over 17,000 nuclear weapons' worth of plutonium into civilian commerce.[8]

Such risky civilian efforts, which are consistent with a MAD-inspired reading of the NPT and the need for the freest exchange of nuclear technology for civilian purposes, are themselves bad enough. What's worse is their encouragement of lax enforcement of existing nonproliferation rules. Japan recently announced that it had lost between 59 and 206 kilograms (10 to 51 crude bombs' worth) of nuclear weapons-usable material over the past 15 years of its civilian breeder and MOX operations. Yet the U.S. made no complaint, and the IAEA conducted no serious investigation. In fact, the IAEA still only makes public its discovery of special nuclear materials it believes are unaccounted for. It keeps no public account of the nearly 200 tons (25,000 to 50,000 crude weapons' worth) of weapons-usable civilian plutonium that specific member states have on hand.[9]

Such a cavalier attitude regarding the sharing, accounting, generation, and safekeeping of civilian nuclear weapons-usable materials and related technologies might have made sense in the MAD world of the NPT in 1968, but after the events of September 11 and al Qeada's announced interest in nuclear explosives, it is woefully unwise.

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[8]For a full discussion of this effort, see Daniel Horner, "Full G8 Funding for Construction of Russian MOX Plant Seen by Year's End," *NuclearFuel* (April 28, 2003).

[9]Each year the IAEA and every second year EURATOM announce the total amounts of plutonium and highly enriched uranium they believe they are safeguarding. Both, however, are barred by rules of confidentiality from specifying what amounts they believe each country they are safeguarding is holding. On this point, see David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, *Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies* (Oxford University Press, 1997), 407; and Albert Wohlstetter et al., *Swords From Plowshares: The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy* (University of Chicago Press, 1977), 65-67.

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Towards a saner set of policies

MAKING THE CHANGES noted above will not be easy. However, it would be a mistake not to try. Currently, there are only five declared nuclear states, all of whose arsenals (except China's) are becoming smaller. India, Pakistan, and Israel also have nuclear weapons, as does North Korea. The question is how much worse it can get. The answer is plenty.

If nothing is done to shore up U.S. and allied security relations with the Gulf Coordination Council states and with Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, Iran's acquisition of even a nuclear weapons breakout capability could prompt one or more of these states to try to acquire a nuclear weapons option of their own. Similarly, if the U.S. fails to hold Pyongyang accountable for its violation of the NPT or lets Pyongyang hold on to one or more nuclear weapons while appearing to reward its violation with a new deal — one that heeds North Korea's demand for a nonaggression pact and continued construction of the two light water reactors — South Korea and Japan (and later, perhaps, Taiwan) will have powerful cause to question Washington's security commitment to them and their own pledges to stay non-nuclear.

In such a world, Washington's worries would not be limited to gauging the military capabilities of a growing number of hostile, nuclear, or near-nuclear-armed nations. In addition, it would have to gauge the reliability of a growing number of nuclear or near-nuclear friends. Washington might still be able to assemble coalitions, but with more nations like France, with nuclear options of their own, it would be much, much more iffy. The amount of international intrigue such a world would generate would also easily exceed what our diplomats and leaders could manage or track. Rather than worry about using force for fear of producing another Vietnam, Washington and its very closest allies are more likely to grow weary of working closely with others and view military options through the rosy lens of their relatively quick victories in Desert Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Just Cause. This would be a world disturbingly similar to that of 1914 but with one big difference: It would be spring-loaded to go nuclear.

To move away from such a future, then, is worth some effort. But what step should be taken first? Cleary, it would be helpful if the U.S. and its allies backed country-neutral rules that would close some of the worst loopholes in the NPT. These gaps principally consist of the NPT's non-application to weapons states outside the treaty, the NPT's lack of any serious enforcement measures, its generous inattention to risky "peaceful" nuclear cooperation, and its allowance of nuclear weapons transfers between states so long as the weapon transferred remains under the control of the exporting nation (e.g., U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Germany).

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To begin to fill these loopholes and to get back to an Irish Resolution view of the NPT generally, one might start by trying to establish an "international common usage" against any state helping others to acquire weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons) such as that which already exists against piracy and the trading in slaves. Piracy and slaving are currently activities that can be conducted only outside of the protection of international law. Any nation that encounters someone engaged in these activities is free to act against them, to arrest them, seize their cargo, or force their vessels or vehicles to return to their point of origin.

One approach to help establish such a rule against weapons of mass destruction might be to establish that nations henceforth must not deploy chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to any other nation in peacetime, whether such weapons remain under control of the first nation or not. Beyond this, the U.S. and like-minded nations should propose that nations no longer ship any special nuclear materials (as defined by the IAEA statute) or any item on Schedule One of the Australia Group's list of biological and chemical weapons items or items on the Nuclear Suppliers' list without giving prior international notification. In fact, shippers' export declarations laws in the U.S. and Australia already require exporters in these states to make prior notification of their export shipments. Other nations should do likewise. These postings could be made on an internationally available website almost immediately.

No nation should be allowed in peacetime to redeploy nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons outside its borders.

In addition, the U.S. and other like-minded nations should declare that henceforth no nation should be allowed in peacetime to redeploy nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons outside its borders. This rule is one the United States, with its various submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missile systems, long-range bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, and sea-based strike aircraft, can easily live with. Any nation violating this rule, whether friendly (e.g., Pakistan) or not (e.g., North Korea), should, again, be subject to interdiction.

Finally, if there is support for stronger action, exports made outside the procedures of IAEA, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and (perhaps) the Missile Technology Control Regime might be banned and targeted for interdiction. This rule would clearly put a bind on nonmembers of these organizations. It would apply not just to Iran, which has announced its desire to export its nuclear expertise, but to China, North Korea, and Pakistan, who trade in nuclear and missile technology. It also could include Israel, which has exported technology to China, and India, a state that announced a military cooperative agreement with Iran and its intent to

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export military technology internationally.

If the U.N. Security Council acted quickly to adopt such a measure, all the better. If it failed to act, however, those who discover a violation of the proposed rules might choose to act on their own. In either case, an international common usage against weapons of mass destruction trade would be beneficial in a number of currently worrisome cases. Pakistan, for one, could no longer contemplate transferring nuclear warheads legally under its control to Saudi Arabia (as its generals have privately suggested they might). Nor could Pyongyang act on its threat to transfer its nuclear weapons to another state without risking having the shipment legally blocked or seized. Beyond this, any strategic weapons-related assistance a Pakistan (or a North Korea, China, Iran, or Russia) might want to give to other states would now have to be announced before it was actually shipped or else hazard being interdicted. This, at the very least, in turn, would help prevent a repeat of another Iran — i.e., of another nation covertly acquiring all it needs to break out quickly with a large arsenal of weapons without quite breaking the rules.

An international common usage against weapons of mass destruction trade would be beneficial in a number of worrisome cases.

This international common usage also would allow the world's Indias, Israels, and Pakistans, who cannot be made weapons state members of the NPT, a formal way to uphold international nonproliferation norms. In addition, it would allow other nations that have bad proliferation reputations (e.g., China and Russia) to work with the U.S. and others to restore their good names. Finally, by establishing an international rule against warhead transfers and dangerous covert trade, it would afford supporters of nonproliferation a legal basis for acting against violators even if they failed to catch them in the act.

If the U.S. wanted to build additional support for this effort, it might offer to remove its prior deployment of nuclear arms in Western Europe. These weapons are almost certain to be removed with the planned reduction of American forces in Germany. Also, most of these weapons are quite old if not obsolete. Such an offer (to do what the U.S. will likely do in time anyway) would still have to be implemented carefully so as not to undermine NATO alliance relations. It could not be done suddenly or appear to be a response to anti-nuclear protests. Assuming this could be done, though, such an offer might help persuade Russia and others to support establishing an international usage against WMD proliferation both before and at the time of any U.N. vote.

In conjunction with the proposed ban on unannounced dangerous trade, a ban on redeploying weapons of mass destruction could set into motion a

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much more serious review of MAD-inspired nonproliferation policies more generally. What should the IAEA and the world's leading nuclear suppliers consider to be safe and dangerous? Should nations like Iran be able to get all they need to break out with a large arsenal virtually overnight? What truly constitutes timely warning of a diversion of civilian technology to military purposes? Is something more than inspection required to find special materials unaccounted for? Does it make sense to spread nuclear bulk handling facilities — reprocessing, enrichment, fuel fabrication plants — where scores of bombs' worth of nuclear weapons material will be present? What of increased civilian commerce in nuclear weapons materials? Is this trade worth the risks, or should it be put on hold? What of missile technologies? Should controls be tightened to prevent proliferation or relaxed to promote missile defense cooperation? In either case, how should this be done?

A debate over all these questions and more is likely assuming the U.S. and others choose to get serious about moving away from MAD toward a world with fewer nuclear weapons in fewer hands. On the other hand, without such a move, the bold steps Washington has already taken away from MAD's opposition to missile defenses will hardly get us where the U.S. and the world should want to go — toward a safer, saner world whose security is based less on nuclear offenses than on defenses, self-restraint, and, in time, the kind of peace that can only come with a world full of Canadas.

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Mosque and State In Iraq

By AMITAI ETZIONI

THE UNITED STATES, in Iraq and elsewhere, should cease promoting a secular civil society as the only alternative to a Taliban-like Shia theocracy. We cannot quell the religious yearnings of millions of Iraqis (and many others elsewhere) merely by fostering strong political and economic institutions and the sound values they embody — to wit, democracy and capitalism. The most effective way to counter a theocracy is to include moderate, liberal religious elements in the civil society we are helping to erect.

The First Amendment's disestablishment clause is not a foreign policy tool, but a peculiarly American conception. Just because the American government is banned from promoting religion within the United States does not mean that the State Department and the Pentagon cannot promote religion overseas in societies that are undergoing profound societal changes. This last point is crucial: Overseas we are participating as a key architect and builder of new institutions; we are in what social scientists call "the design business." This is quite distinct from what we do at home: shoring up a solid social structure designed two centuries ago, careful not to rock the foundations or undermine the pillars on which it stands. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other Third World countries, we participate in the ground-breaking, foundation-laying stage, one in which elements we can take for granted at home — such as a thriving religious life within civil society — must be provided.

The current U.S. position reflects, whether deliberately or unwittingly, the

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"end of history" conception that all ideologies are on their last legs as the world embraces the American (or Western) ideals of democracy, human rights, and free markets. This notion, in turn, is but an extension of the Enlightenment conceit that modernity is based on rational thinking, which religion is not, and hence religion is "history" while secularism (reason, science) is the future. Accordingly, societies in which religion is "still" playing a key role are considered behind the times, underdeveloped. As we are learning, however, all over the world people have spiritual needs that cannot be addressed, let alone satisfied, by Enlightenment ideals.

We are witnessing an explosive growth of Christianity in East Asia (in 2000, China had 3.5 million Catholics, up from less than half a million in the mid-1980s); on the Korean peninsula, where nearly a quarter of the population is Christian, a 4,000 percent increase from the early part of the twentieth century; and in Africa (360 million Christians in 2000, compared to 10 million in 1900). We find an "outpouring of pent-up religious [fervor]," as sociologist Alan Aldridge put it, in Russia (which nearly doubled the number of adherents to the Russian Orthodox Church from 1970 to 2000) and other former communist nations in Eastern Europe. And there has been a rise in Islam not only in countries that were never modernized, but even in those that have had extensive secular, modern periods — such as, most tellingly, Turkey. In the United States, although there are continuous debates over the depth of American religious commitments and the possibility of a religious revival, no one doubts that religion is a major force in American life and that important elements of our civil society are faith-based. We should export to Iraq — and to other countries challenged by fundamentalism — our mixed secular and religious civil society.

The reason religion cannot be suppressed, why religion is reasserting itself where it was formerly stifled or thriving where it was never held back, is that it speaks to profound questions to which many millions of people seek answers. These are transcendental questions such as why we are cast into this world, why we are born to die, and what life's purpose might be. In addition, there are moral questions such as what we owe to our children, to our elderly parents, and to our friends, communities, and nations. Neither democracy nor capitalism speaks to these issues. Secular humanism does provide some answers, but not ones all find compelling; the answers deal largely with moral issues but much less with the truly transcendent ones.

The quest for spiritual answers of one kind or another is evident both in former communist countries and in Islamic countries in which the theocracy is breaking down (such as Iran) or has been ended (e.g., Afghanistan). In all these countries, the breakdown of tyranny precedes an explosive growth of new kinds of anti-social behavior. (I write *new* kinds of anti-social behavior because other kinds — corruption or spying on one's friends, co-workers, and neighbors, for instance — were, of course, quite common in the pre-liberation days.) These countries experience sharp rises in drug abuse, HIV, divorce, and crime. The *New York Times Magazine* published a particularly

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distressing account of the reemergence of pedophiles in Kabul, who did not dare act out during the Taliban days.

The reason is obvious: Once police terror as the source of social order is removed, it must be replaced by some other source or else moral and social anarchy will arise. Order in a free society rests primarily on people choosing to refrain from anti-social behavior because of their moral upbringing and the informal enforcement of social norms. No free society can make police the mainstay of its social order; law enforcement's proper place is as a back-up to an order largely undergirded by morality. Sending the military police into newly freed countries and training local cops are of course necessary, but they will not curb anti-social behavior unless accompanied by a new moral code. Religion has been and very much still is one major source of such mores. The religion we should promote is compatible with democracy and not oppressive in its own terms and institutions. Call it a "soft" religion.

A soft Islam

I KNOW A BIT about how receptive Shiites are to a non-Wahhabi, moderate, soft Islam because they laid out their position during a three-day meeting in Iran that I attended a year ago. It ended just as the holiday commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hossein began. Although the reformers — headed by Dr. Seyyed Ataollah Mohajerani of the International Centre for Dialogue Among Civilizations — organized the meeting, several hardliners also participated. The main point, repeatedly stressed during the meeting, was that both Shia camps — the hardliners and the reformers — want to live in an Islamic society. The main difference between them is that the prevailing hardliners are committed to enforcing the religious code through morality squads, secret police, and jails — in short, the government — while the reformers favor encouraging people to be devout rather than forcing them to abide by the Prophet's dictates. The line most often repeated was: "If you do not force people to come, they will *want* to come."

A similar approach was laid out by professor Muqtedar Khan of Adrian College in Michigan, who writes:

> Moderate Muslims aspire for a society — a city of virtue — that will treat all people with dignity and respect. There will be no room for political or normative intimidation. Individuals will aspire to live an ethical life because they recognize its desirability. Communities will compete in doing good and politics will seek to encourage good and forbid evil. They believe that the internalization of the message of Islam can bring about the social transformation necessary for the establishment of the virtuous city. The only arena in which moderate Muslims permit excess is in idealism.

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Many have attempted to outline the features of a soft Islam in recent years, resulting in several typologies of liberal, modest, modern, and Euro-Islam that are contrasted with militant, virulent, and fundamentalist Islam. Naturally, there is no agreement about the interpretation of relevant texts and traditions. Nor is it possible (or necessary) to review this large body of literature here. Rather, I seek to list several key features of the sort of Islam the United States should support in those parts of the world where it must counter Muslim fundamentalism.

Soft Islam, as the Islamic legal theorist Khaled Abou El Fadl has described it, differs from the fundamentalist version in that it draws on the members of the community for consultations (*sharia*) rather than relying on rulings from the mullahs. The concept of *sharia* has been traced to the pre-Islamic era, when tribal councils decided important public issues through consultation. Professor Forough Jahanbakhish of Queen's University in Canada adds that most modern scholars hold that such consultative bodies should be composed of representatives of the whole community, and not just elites.

In 2001, President Mohammad Khatami of Iran, the leader of the reformers, stated that "the constitution [of Iran] states that the rule is Allah's . . . but it also states that this Divine rule is based on people's opinions. Man is Allah's representative on earth and the right to rule does not refer to any specific person. Rather, it refers to all those who participate in elections and set the government's agenda." Another principle discussed by some — including Abou El Fadl in his book *And God Knows the Soldiers: The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourse* (University Press of America, 2001) — is one attributed to the Prophet: that "every *mujtahid* [the person exerting effort in deducing the law] is correct." This means, according to Abou El Fadl, that "one must search for the law without fear of failure" and that while humans strive to discover the Divine Will, "no one has the authority to lay an exclusive claim to it."

Others have stressed that the Koran is open to different interpretations rather than commanding one strict, rigid, by-the-book line. As Khan writes in his essay "Who Are Moderate Muslims?":

> *Ijtihad* narrowly understood is a juristic tool that allows independent reasoning to articulate Islamic law on issues where textual sources are silent. The unstated assumption being when texts have spoken reason must be silent. But increasingly moderate Muslim intellectuals see *Ijtihad* as the spirit of Islamic thought that is necessary for the vitality of Islamic ideas and Islamic civilization. . . . For moderate Muslims, *Ijtihad* is a way of life, which simultaneously allows Islam to reign supreme in the heart and the mind to experience unfettered freedom of thought. A moderate Muslim is therefore one who cherishes freedom of thought while recognizing the existential necessity of faith.

Abou El Fadl, a professor at UCLA, provides examples of conflicting Koranic interpretations in *And God Knows the Soldiers*. The Koran, he

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explains, commands believers, "Do not take a life which God has forbidden unless for some just cause." Yet what constitutes "just cause" is susceptible to debate. The Koran also instructs, "And do not kill yourselves." But whether smoking, for example, is a form of killing oneself is also a matter of debate. Regarding the veil or headscarf (*hijab*) worn by many Muslim women, Abou El Fadl writes:

> Most importantly, the historical setting and the complexity of the early context do suggest that the inquiries into the juristic basis of the *hijab* cannot be considered heretical. In this sense, labeling the *hijab* as a part of the *usul* [the foundations of the faith upon which disagreement is not tolerated], and using that label as an excuse to end the discussion in the matter, is obscenely despotic. It might very well be that this is yet another legal issue where the law of God is pursuant to the convictions of the pious adherent.

That last comment is particularly important. When religions are moderated, whether the reforms include praying in the vernacular or allowing men and women to worship together, there is a common fear that the whole construction will unravel. Hence, drawing a distinction between an inviolate core and the other elements is crucial to fostering the sense that one can reinterpret the various religious dictates while maintaining the religion's essence. Soft Islam builds on this difference between the core and the rest; rigid Islam denies the existence of such a distinction. Thus, the Iranian historian and reformer Hashem Aghajari has addressed the question of the mullah's religious authority in this way:

> The Protestant movement wanted to rescue Christianity from the clergy and the Church hierarchy — [Christians] must save religion from the pope. We [Muslims] do not need mediators between us and God. We do not need mediators to understand God's holy books. The Prophet [Jesus] spoke to the people directly. . . . We don't need to go to the clergy; each person is his own clergy.

A particularly important case of divergent interpretations of Islam, one antithetical to a civil global society and one very supportive of it, is found in the debate over the meaning of "*jihad*." Some Muslims interpret *jihad* to mean "holy war." A group of sheikhs in Cairo, expressing this view, has determined that, "According to Islamic law, if the enemy steps on Muslims' land, *jihad* becomes a duty of every male and female Muslim." Before the recent conflict, Iraqi Imam Omar Hussein Asengawy issued a *fatwa* — an authoritative religious ruling — holding that all Muslims were obligated to wage war against the United States in the event of an attack on Iraq. "Let's wage *jihad* together," he told his coreligionists last December, "to face the enemy and the infidel." At the heart of the "holy war" viewpoint is the presumption that all nonbelievers are lower-grade human beings, contemptuously referred to as *kaffir*.

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In other, civil interpretations, *jihad* is conceived as a solely spiritual struggle. Abou El Fadl writes, "*Jihad* . . . means to strive, to apply oneself, to struggle, and persevere. In many ways, *jihad* connotes a strong spiritual and material work ethic in Islam." Islamic scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr explains in *The Heart of Islam* (Harper San Francisco, 2002) that "*jihad* is therefore the inner battle to purify the soul of its imperfections, to empty the vessel of the soul of the pungent water of forgetfulness, negligence, and the tendency of evil and to prepare it for the reception of the Divine Elixir of Remembrance, Light, and Knowledge."

These writings represent a small sample of a huge body of literature, yet they illustrate the basic character of a soft Islam. Such an Islam seeks to educate and encourage good conduct rather than coerce it, is open to reinterpretation on all matters but its core, welcomes participation by the members of the community rather than dictates from the mullahs, and spreads spiritually rather than by the sword.

Institutional implications

ISLAM, LIKE JUDAISM but unlike Protestantism, is much more a behavioral and less a theological religion. Promoting soft Islam in Iraq and elsewhere cannot be accomplished solely through scholarly symposia on the meaning of moderate Islam or by creating anthologies and delivering lectures, although these activities all have their place. We must turn to policy. The most effective way to develop such a conception is to embody it in new institutions for the whole world to see. Moreover, as we remain knee-deep in rebuilding Iraq, concrete questions — not just matters of theory — must be faced.

Schools provide an especially suitable environment in which to start to examine the third way between theocracy and a secular civil society. Education in several Islamic countries is carried out in *madrasas*. These are the places where young people are drilled in Wahhabi Islam and anti-Western principles and pumped full of rigid interpretations of religious texts, learning by rote, with next to no exposure to science and the liberal arts. *Madrasas* are common in theocracies such as the Taliban's Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and northern Pakistan. If the dominant Shiites in Iraq have their way, these schools will be introduced in that country as well. In place of the *madrasas*, Delaware Senator Joseph Biden has suggested that we should promote secular, American-public-school-like institutions.

Another alternative is to provide two tracks of education within public schools. One track would be essentially secular (although children would learn about religion), and the other would dedicate a significant proportion of the teaching — say, 20 percent — to religious subjects. (We may not wish to advertise to Iraqis that this approach is followed in Israel, but that example shows that the approach is feasible.) In Malaysia, in which there is a

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large Muslim population but a relatively moderate one, both secular and religious education are provided: Muslim children can attend secular school in the morning and religious classes in the afternoon.

To ensure that the religious part of public schooling is used for soft religious teachings rather than for fundamentalist indoctrination, the teachers, although as a rule from a given religious group (Shiites in southern Iraq, for example), need to be qualified and selected by the school rather than by religious groups, and the teaching material must be approved by the ministry of education.

This is a sound educational system for several reasons: It prevents fundamentalist education; ensures that all children will acquire the rudiments of modern education; allows those parents who seek it to secure a significant amount of religious schooling for their children with the costs covered by the state; and ensures that children of different backgrounds — secular and religious — will mix, an outcome that is prevented when some of the children go to segregated religious schools. Above all, such a two-track system allows a government to promote moderate religions without preventing anyone who (or whose parent) wishes to have secular education from gaining it. Thus, it is a prime example of how a government can promote religion and still ensure that it will be liberal.

Establishing a civil society with religious elements may also proceed through the provision of social services.

The institutionalization of a civil society with religious elements may also proceed through the provision of social services. In several parts of the Islamic world (in southern Iraq, for instance), various religious bodies provide social services. In France, social services — including health care, welfare, and child care — are provided largely by the secular arms of the government. A third way would be to continue to utilize whatever governmental and secular voluntary social services are available and to expand them while also drawing on religious services — the way it is done in the United States. Despite America's uncommonly strong commitment to disestablishment, the U.S. government relies to a significant extent on voluntary religious groups to provide many social services. This is done either by contracting with various religious groups for the provision of social services or by allowing religious institutions — Catholic or Jewish hospitals, for example — to receive Medicare and Medicaid payments via individuals who choose to be served by them. As of 2001, 75 percent of the funding for the Jewish Board of Family and Children Services came from government sources. Catholic Charities' programs receive about 66 percent of their funding from government grants and contracts, and Lutheran Services in America receives more than 33 percent of its annual budget from government funds. Indeed, the United States is expanding its

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reliance on faith-based institutions following the Charitable Choice Act of 1996 and the Bush administration's faith-based initiative. All this could be applied to Iraq, relying on what amounts to two-track social services — those provided by government agencies and those provided by faith-based institutions. Here too the government would impose some limitations on the ways in which religious groups can use public funds. Specifically, it would require that the funds be used fully for social services and not for political action or fundamentalist indoctrination.

Finally, a government keen on promoting a two-track civil society might pay the salaries of the Muslim clergy and the maintenance costs of mosques. To Americans this may seem highly controversial and a gross violation of the separation of church and state, but it is a common practice in many democracies: In Catholic countries such as Spain and Italy, for instance, as well as in Scandinavia and Germany. (In some countries, this is done indirectly; in some cases, the government collects a special church tax from those who attend church, but the net effect is that the clergy are publicly supported and not dependent on passing the plate.) Once the government pays for clergy, it is free to determine who qualifies as such. Fundamentalist preachers will surely not be banned from practicing, but they will not do so on public dollars. A group of moderate clergy may advise the government on who is qualified to serve in the public religious sector.

Once the government pays for clergy, it is free to determine who qualifies as such.

One may ask, "But what about Christians and other religious groups?" The same arrangements would apply to them. Social services could be delivered by these religious communities, their clergy compensated, and two-track teaching provided. Lest this sound too abstract, one should note that despite our insistence on the separation of state and church, we in effect are a two-track society; this reality is well illustrated by the fact that we allow various religious authorities to conduct marriages that are recognized by the state and also enable people to be married in a civil ceremony without any religious trappings.

The trouble is that so far, we have been approaching Iraq as if we favor *only* secular institutions. The 13 points released by the U.S. Central Command headquarters in Qatar in mid-April state that Iraq must be a democracy, that the rule of law must be paramount, and that the role of women must be respected — all of which are fine, but all speak to the secular elements of the future Iraq. A two-track approach to constructing a civil society in Iraq, one that provides ample room both for soft Islam and for secular institutions, not only would serve better in countering fundamentalism than sheer secularism, but also would respond to a wider array of human needs.

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Soft Islam and democracy

MUCH OF THE recent literature on Islam focuses on the question of whether Islam is or can be made compatible with a democratic regime, an inquiry closely related but not identical to the question of whether there is a soft Islam that can serve as an antidote to Islamic fundamentalism. Can Islam live with free elections, tolerate a free press, grant equal rights to women, tolerate secular authorities, and the rest? Although there is little agreement on this subject, one of the earmarks of soft Islam is that it *can* coexist with democratic political institutions.

To provide but one example: Treating women as men's equals in moderate Islamic societies, instead of in the demeaning and abusive way of Islamic fundamentalism, draws on two rather different principles. One is respect for the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other more general, secular liberal political theories, which extol the virtues of individual dignity and individual rights. Another is a soft interpretation of Islam based on arguments such as those made by Forough Jahanbakhish in *Islam, Democracy, and Religious Modernism in Iran, 1953-2000* (Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2001): Previous generations have misinterpreted Islamic sources, and the inferior status of women is a product of the social conditions at the time of the Koran, not the moral teachings of it. In *Nine Parts of Desire: The Hidden World of Islamic Women* (Anchor Books, 1995), Geraldine Brooks questions whether rules that were clearly meant to apply only to the Prophet's wives, such as seclusion, should have been extended to all Muslim women.

The significance of the difference between these approaches is that if one draws, for political legitimacy, merely on respect for the U.N. Declaration and the ideals associated with it — that is, on Locke and Kant, the Founders, and the Federalist Papers — one in effect presumes that support for democracy must be secular. If one also draws on soft interpretations of Islam, one finds that Islam can be made compatible with democracy so that promoting religion as an essential element of civil society will not hinder the development of a liberal democracy. As Daniel Pipes, a scholar of the Middle East, has put it, "militant Islam is the problem, and moderate Islam is the solution."

It follows that by promoting soft Islam we get two for the price of one: We promote a religion that is compatible with liberal democracy as well as one that can serve as an effective antidote to the fundamentalists. I take it for granted that Iraq should have a democratic form of government. But it should be one that does not treat religion per se as a threat but, potentially, as a mainstay of civil society, and hence as something that should be promoted — that is, to be sure, in its soft, moderate forms.

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
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BOOKS

Pride and Resentment

By ROBERT HOWSE

JEAN-FRANÇOIS REVEL. *L'Obsession anti-américaine: Son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconséquences* (*The Anti-American Obsession: How It Operates, Its Causes, and Its Lack of Consequence*). PLON. 299 PAGES. €20.00

IF YOU BELIEVED CNN around the time of the Iraq war, marching against the American empire had surpassed soccer as the weekend pastime of ordinary Europeans. Words like tragedy and crisis scream out from the op-ed pages of the "serious" media to describe the supposed breakdown in understanding and friendship between "Europe" and America. But how much of this is the bluster and rhetoric of elites and trendsters, and how much a reality that needs to be taken dead seriously?

Not the least of the merits of Jean-François Revel's 2002 book — a best-seller in France (!) — is to demonstrate how European anti-Americanism is largely the creation and obsession of the (mostly Marxist or post-Marxist) chattering classes. Ordinary Europeans don't hate the U.S., it turns out, at least not in large numbers. Indeed, as Revel argues, how in all fairness could they? The prosperity and freedom in Europe today are hardly imaginable without the Marshall Plan reconstruction and the security guarantees that America provided throughout the Cold War; economically and socially, contemporary Europe is the fruit of the liberalism of which, in many respects, according to Revel, the United States is the avant garde.

Now lacking a plausible alternative "*projet de société*," the Marxist, or post-Marxist, European left is more and more tempted to define itself in terms of what it is against — America and the globalization of which America and its "empire" are supposed to be the driving forces. At the same time, this "anti-" outlook gets picked up and exploited, as Revel points out, by mainstream political and bureaucratic elites, who are anxious to draw attention away from the foreign and domestic policy failures of Europe itself. Thus, the attack on American "unilateralism" and "imperialism" masks the abject failure of Europe itself to agree on a plausible common foreign and defense policy. In the sense that the Europeans failed to propose any viable alternatives in dealing with terrorism and with Iraq and North Korea, according to Revel, "[American] unilateralism is their doing." The violence of America's inner

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cities, the lack of public health care in the U.S., and the failures of the "melting pot" to address cultural diversity — these are all convenient ways of making Europeans feel less bad about their own stagnant economies, crumbling welfare states, and the woes of managing the tensions in the schools and the streets produced by Western Europe's large and growing Muslim populations. Citing a wide range of evidence, Revel provides Europeans with a reality check: Just as Europe today is not as compassionate, generous, and tolerant as European elites would like their citizens to believe, nor is the United States as Darwinian or Hobbesian.

MOST OF THIS is persuasive and laudable. Yet, like the ideologues that he deplores, Revel himself tends to go overboard with the rhetoric, if in an opposite direction. While the leftists he criticizes are downright paranoid about global liberal capitalism, Revel is simplistic in his unqualified praise for it. At times, he makes the same mistake as the critics — a straightforward identification of the globalization agenda with what America stands for. According to Revel, "what those who are marching against globalization are attacking is, for at least half a century, the most prosperous and creative capitalist democratic society. They are attacking liberalism or simply liberty, from which they are among the first to benefit, since they can move from one place to another on the spur of the moment, as they wish."

But terrorism itself — on which Revel is rightly very hard — has been sustained by the global networks of information, of movement, and of people that go hand in hand with globalization (as Moisés Naím has pointed out in a recent and provocative article in *Foreign Policy*, "The Five Wars of Globalization," January-February 2003). Nor are U.S. critics of globalization all guilty of American self-hatred, à la Susan Sontag. Some, including notable conservatives, are worried about the loss of democratic sovereignty, especially to global economic bureaucracies like the WTO.

Another polemical exaggeration by Revel — and a very regrettable one — is the notion that Islam is necessarily radical, anti-liberal, and intolerant. He writes: "What dictates the Muslims' vision of the world is the notion that all of humanity should respect the imperatives of their religion, while they themselves owe no respect to any of the religions of others."

It is one thing — and quite correct — to counter the illusion that the current leadership of Islam is primarily moderate and responsible, despite a few "bad apples" whipping up the crowd. It is quite another to make generalizations about a religious faith that has taken many social and political forms — including the Islam of the medieval philosophers, influenced by Plato and Aristotle — over very many centuries.

Here Revel's mistake comes from a deep flaw in his view of progress in human history. Perhaps even more so than the Francis Fukuyama of the "End of History," Revel tends to see the global future as the American version of liberal capitalism — which is pragmatist, materialist, and hyper-individualist when viewed as a pure "ideal-type." He thus tends to view any opposition to the predominance of this model as irrational resistance by fanat-

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ics or leftist "poor losers," and, in comparison to America, Revel sees Western European societies and economies as imperfect and arrested versions of the liberal capitalist "ideal-type." But, instead of linear progress, fast or slow, towards an American-style "ideal type" of liberal capitalism, might we not be witnessing important and defensible variants of liberal capitalism, and indeed compromises *between* capitalist or bourgeois liberty and socialist equality?

THE FRENCH-RUSSIAN philosopher Alexandre Kojève thought in those terms; it was his Hegelian idea of the end of history that led to Fukuyama's speculations in the first place. According to Kojève, had liberal capitalism not adopted social welfare policies that were at first struggled for by the workers and the left, it might well have met the fate predicted by Marx himself. It is certainly questionable whether, as Revel sometimes suggests, the social welfare state built in Europe after the war reflected the difficulty that mainstream Western European politicians had in getting Marxism out of their systems and Communist Party ministers out of their cabinets. Rather, it could well have been a necessary and successful bulwark against the kind of social and economic instability that might have been disastrously exploited by Moscow. Revel suggests that Western Europe's political leadership "never understood communism" and the threat it posed. But this is not warranted by the actual history of NATO. Europeans deserve more credit, and ought to be prouder than Revel would suggest, for having resisted successfully the Marxist temptation, preserving the NATO alliance, and integrating each others' economies based on the ideal of a regulated and socially just market system.

To return to Kojève, writing at the end of the Second World War in his "Esquisse d'une doctrine de la politique française" ("Outline of a French Policy Doctrine," forthcoming in English translation by Erik DeVries), he predicted not a linear progression to American-style liberal capitalism but a long period of empires, one being the Soviet Empire, and another the Anglo-American Empire (which would include Germany as long as it depended on the U.S. for defense against Soviet Russia). As for continental Europe, it wouldn't be able to rival the military power of the Anglo-Americans, but, led by the French, it could, he thought, express a different sensibility, a way of life rather different from that adopted by the materialist, pragmatist, individualist Anglo-Americans.

Some of what Revel characterizes as anti-Americanism could be better understood as the search for such an alternative. The rejection of genetically modified (GM) foods, the "slow food" movement, even the much-reviled four-day work week suggest a (modestly) different set of value choices, a social model that is less driven by work, less concerned with savings of time and crude efficiency, more open to beauty, charm, and friendship.

To my mind, these differences, far from threatening to America or to the West, actually display the falsity of one kind of anti-American and anti-globalization prejudice — the notion that the Occident is a monolith, ideologically blinkered, and incapable of encompass-

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ing dissenting views about the best way of life. And this cannot be reduced to a left-right divide, either: American social conservatives cannot but be concerned, for instance, about the effects on family life of the obsession with work and more work among much of the U.S. middle class. In Europe, feminism has made as many or even more gains in achieving justified equality of opportunities as in the U.S., but without being nearly as culturally and socially divisive; generally speaking, European feminists have stayed away from misandry and have been less prepared to see differentiation of gender roles in the family and private life as threatening to equal respect between men and women. As the conservative Catholic communitarian Mary Ann Glendon has suggested in *Abortion and Divorce in Western Law* (Harvard University Press, 1989), some Western European societies have mapped out an approach to the issue of abortion that avoids (in Laurence Tribe's words) the "clash of absolutes" that has characterized that controversy in America. In sum, one should not jump easily to the conclusion that the values of liberal capitalism have always been better or more adequately implemented in America than in Europe, and this is true whether one is on the left or the right, or neither.

One should not jump easily to the conclusion that the values of liberal capitalism have always been better or more adequately implemented in America than in Europe, and this is true whether one is on the left or the right, or neither.

And that may make a difference in how Americans ought to respond to European criticism, an issue not addressed head-on by Revel because his book is really pitched at a French audience. Writing in the *New York Review of Books* (February 13, 2003), Timothy Garton Ash has recently bemoaned the crude anti-Europeanism of some conservative pundits and activists in the United States.

Anti-Europeanism is a silly answer to anti-Americanism for a number of reasons. One, which goes to a central finding of Revel's study, is that despite being bombarded with anti-Americanism by their elites, ordinary Europeans are really not that anti-American. So why turn them into enemies by blaming them for animosity that they don't actually possess? Second, as has just been discussed, some criticisms of America by Europeans may represent a respectable and justified pride in doing certain things better and differently than they are done on the other side of the Atlantic. Such a pride in difference is part of the psychology of the collective self-respect of any society, including a liberal democratic one — it becomes pathological when it spills out into hatred and jingoism, but it need not do so. Dealing with transatlantic differences can be exasperating, true, but it is

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wrong to view such differences as necessarily a threat or an act of hostility to America, as for example does Andrew Sullivan, writing in the *New Republic* (June 16, 2003): "France's intentions, as we now know from bitter experience, are essentially hostile to the United States, culturally, economically, diplomatically." In contrast, a more subtle and balanced view of American-French differences is offered by a recent Merchant/Ivory movie, *Le Divorce*, which portrays the differences as a source not only of frustration and heartache, but of fascination, humor, and even self-discovery for Americans.

Finally, there is a degree of anti-Americanism that simply goes with the role of being the world's only superpower. And indeed this is one of Revel's most keenly observed points.

In Thucydides's *Peloponnesian War*, the Athenians with brazenness or honesty — depending on one's point of view — admit that it is natural for the governing elites of the lesser cities to resent their imperial power. But the Athenians also believe that those same elites should be *grateful* that the Athenians' imperialism is gentle and brings benefits for all. When gratitude is not forthcoming, the Athenians are piqued, despite the law of human nature about resentment of power that they themselves acknowledge, and such pique leads to misjudgments of strategy and interest.

Americans, even (and much) more than the ancient Athenians, want to be popular. But popularity may not always be easy to square with the role that the U.S. is now fated to play in the world. Americans should accept a certain degree of unpopularity as at times inevitable. This means, above all, not trying to be popular at the cost of failing to do what is right (the typical argument of the kind of American left-liberals who think we should panic about irritating the French over Iraq).

At the same time, Americans should be dispassionate and clear-headed enough not to resent others who fail to welcome the U.S. with open arms, even if those others themselves stand to gain from America's global role. We should remember that the French and the Germans and most other peoples with a strong self-concept aren't mostly interested in being popular — respected, feared, admired, deferred to, envied, yes, but popular, hardly.

Contrary to one fashionable narrative, America was not attacked on September 11 because it was unpopular, but rather because it was seen as vulnerable. Bin Laden hit the nail on the head in one of those taped monologues. If there is a strong horse and a weak horse, people will bet on the strong horse (or the horse that looks strong, one should add). That isn't some verse from the Koran; it's more or less a translation of Machiavelli's dictum that it is better to be feared than loved; love can go hand in hand with contempt, and contempt can lead to one's enemies being emboldened.

Perhaps the most important failure of Revel's book is to explore the role of contempt, or the idea of America's weakness, in anti-Americanism, especially that of Islamic extremists living in Europe. This is the notion that, for all its apparent economic and military might, America is a nation of decadent, hedonistic cowards who scare easily. Now, this is one anti-American prejudice that does have consequences, but ironically, Revel is ill-situated to rail

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against it. For it was Revel himself in *How Democracies Perish* (Doubleday, 1984) who warned that Western societies, including and especially the United States, might not have the backbone to stand up to anti-liberal, anti-Western extremism. I wonder whether he is aware of how he played into the one kind of anti-Americanism that we really have to worry about.

Iran's Fragile Fault Lines

By Sanam Vakil

Geneive Abdo and Jonathan Lyons. *Answering Only to God: Faith and Freedom in Twenty-First-Century Iran.* Henry Holt & Co. 320 pages. $25.00

The war in Iraq has been both a blessing and a curse for neighboring Iran. On the one hand, the conservative clerics, grappling to retain their hold on power, should applaud the American "Great Satan" for removing Iran's two most menacing enemies — the Taliban to the east and Saddam Hussein to the west. Moreover, in the face of growing domestic dissent, the war has enabled and justified a conservative crackdown to preserve the facade of clerical unity.

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In essence, the Iranian government has used the war to its advantage — to bolster its international image by cooperating with the U.S. presence in Iraq while also protecting itself on the home front. On the other hand, the liberation of Iraq, especially the Shia sanctuaries of Najaf and Karbala, poses a challenge to the Iranian clerics who have reigned from Iran's holy city of Qom since the 1979 Islamic revolution and since Saddam Hussein's subsequent suppression of the Iraqi Shia. Prior to the revolution, Najaf — which houses the shrine of Ali, the fourth caliph of Islam and first imam of Shia Islam — was the center of Shiite learning in the Muslim world. Besides being a Shia shrine of significance, the city is also the site from which the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini criticized the shah throughout the 1960s and 1970s. With Najaf liberated, Iraqi Shia could challenge and reclaim the clerical potency lost to the Qom school. More menacing for the Iranian government, though, is the fear that Najaf could become another place of exile or escape for Iranian clerics who have remained silently opposed to the Islamic theocracy.

These recent developments coincide with the timely book, *Answering to God: Faith and Freedom in Twenty-First-Century Iran*, by Geneive Abdo and Jonathan Lyons. This husband-and-wife journalist team moved to Iran in 1998 at the apex of the budding reform movement. It comes as no surprise that, as the only American journalists to live in Iran since the revolution and after conducting "hundreds" of interviews over the course of their three-year stint, Abdo and Lyons claim they were forced to "flee" to avoid prosecution in 2001. Despite the con-

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troversy surrounding their departure from Iran, *Answering to God* has an interesting message that runs counter to that of the overly exuberant Western media: The reform movement in Iran is neither monolithic nor united in its push for political change, nor is it on the brink of facilitating another revolution. In fact, whereas the 1979 revolution was a product of 30 to 40 years of what the scholar Hamid Dabashi calls a "theology of discontent," the restlessness brewing in Iran today is the result of failed revolutionary goals and social frustrations — "the failure of the preceding generation," as Abdo and Lyons put it, "to realize the revolution's full potential."

This disillusionment uncovered by Abdo and Lyons took 20 years to be heard, let alone to be translated into a "reform" movement. Khomeini and his co-conspirators were successful in consolidating their power while simultaneously distracting the population with the eight-year Iran-Iraq war and the revolutionary terminology of "neither East nor West." Amidst the martyr's crusade and international isolation, Khomeini "create[d] a theocracy by stealth." Even today, the country continues to operate within a revolutionary paradigm, with ideological rhetoric and revolutionary symbolism still ominously penetrating the personal sphere through television, newspapers, billboards, and fiery Friday sermons. Through the haze of these diversions, what remains clear is that the clerics are still trying to blame the failures of their revolution on outside forces. The glaring reality is that, having shunned the Great Satan (the United States), the little Satan (Israel), and the former Soviet Union, the mullahs have no one to blame for their failures but themselves. It is against this backdrop that President Mohammad Khatami, the white horse progressive candidate, was elected in 1997. In this environment of reform fever Abdo and Lyons sought to immerse themselves.

They did just that, but what they unearthed in their investigative reporting challenged the news of a "Tehran spring." Indeed, they found a revolution "devouring its young" while struggling to perpetuate a veneer of unity. What was originally perceived to be a universal reform movement was actually a divided assembly of factions coming together under a reformist umbrella. These factions consisted of students, intellectuals, and clerics seeking diverse forms of political change through a host of different means. As Abdo and Lyons discovered, the reform movement was allowed to prosper only to foster hope and promise among the Iranian youth, who comprise 50 percent of the population. And hope did in fact spring as newspapers flourished and a critical dialogue blossomed throughout the universities and teahouses of Tehran. Ironically, the leaders of such discussions were once revolutionaries themselves, having adamantly supported Khomeini, having participated in the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, and even having fought in the Iran-Iraq war. They did not partake in criticism during these war-torn consolidation years because they maintained a profound faith in and respect for Khomeini's judgment. However, even the infallible Imam Khomeini proved incapable of delivering victory. For these reformists a turning point emerged where "the bitter realities of the war exposed the ambiguities and

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contradictions in the Islamic system they had left behind." For a whole generation of activists and thinkers, the last years of the war made them rethink things, helping them to accept reformist ideas: "Iran's forces showed the utmost courage in the war to ensure victory, but there was no victory. We had had absolute belief in our own will and determination. We thought we could change the world and shape it, like putty in our hands. The war showed there was much that was outside the reach of our will." From the disappointment of defeat began the dialogue towards a democratic imperative.

It is here that Abdo and Lyons provide a significant contribution. Throughout the book they recount their discussions with important contemporary challengers to the clerical regime. Setting aside their anecdotal commentary, these conversations shed light on the current Iranian predicament: the struggle of a people to translate their desire for political reform into a reality. Indeed, that many of the regime's detractors are members of the clerical establishment themselves reveals that opposition is no longer limited to the silent majority. In fact, as revealed by Abdo and Lyons, in this reform milieu, students, mullahs, and intellectuals alike have expressed their distaste for the absolute, undemocratic nature of the *velayat-e-faqih*, the "Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisprudent" (or "rule by Islamic jurists") created by Khomeini in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution.

Among the many figures featured in the book is Abdollah Nouri. A young reformist cleric, former interior minister under President Khatami, and considered to be Iran's contemporary "Socrates," Nouri has been among the most vocal challengers of the Islamic regime. He has questioned, "How is it possible to give priority to the opinion of one person [the supreme leader] or a few personas or a small social group [the clerical class] over the opinion and vote of all of the majority of the people? This is the highest form of despotism and its ugliest face." His punishment for this defection was a 20-month prison term.

More interesting is the critique of Grand Ayatollah Ali Hossein Montazeri, placed under house arrest from 1997 to 2002 for disparaging Khomeini's successor, Ali Khamenei. He argues that "the notion of Islamic government ha[s] been perverted at the expense of popular sovereignty. Supreme clerical rule ha[s] become a cover for religious and political despotism." Montazeri is renowned for his commentary on the 1989 constitutional amendment withdrawing the *marja-i-taqlid* requirement for the supreme leader. (A *marja-i-taqlid* is the highest "source of emulation" within the Shia religious community.) In removing this requisite, Khamenei, who is not a *marja-i-taqlid,* was able to assume the position of the *faqih* after Khomeini's death. According to Montazeri, adjusting the constitution in this way went counter to the notion of Islamic democracy, in which a *marja-i-taqlid* would ascend to the esteemed position only after years of theological study as well as with the support of the community. For Montazeri, the direct election of the *faqih* by the clerical community would reinstate its lost legitimacy.

Mohsen Kadivar, a modernist theologian also imprisoned for his vocal

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opposition, is another profiled in the text. Echoing the prose of Montazeri and also arguing that the revolution was designed to bring about freedom, Kadivar has disparaged the role of the *faqih* for being antithetical to Shia Islam as well as for being antidemocratic. "These two types of governments [democracy and supreme clerical rule], if their principles are to apply in reality and not only in theory, are incompatible. They are contradictory." With the institution of the *faqih*, the freedom desired by the people was supplanted by authoritarian rule, ultimately negating the goals of the revolution. Kadivar's indictment of the *faqih* goes back to the Koran and Hadith, according to which, he suggests, there is no support for an institution of supreme clerical rule. He equates the notion of the *faqih* to the atavistic Iranian monarchical tradition that, despite an Islamic revolution, has yet to be disbanded. In essence, this culture of kingship has been continued even though the crown was replaced with a clerical turban. This, in turn, explains the success and popularity of Ayatollah Khomeini and even President Khatami, despite the lack of freedom, as Iranians have responded to their leaders with the same naïve deference and admiration seen in the days of the shahs. Some have argued that a tangible evolution in Iranian politics would require a profound change in Iran's political culture, one that would incorporate the notion of political pluralism over that of political despotism.

That hope, for now, has been quashed. President Khatami, elected on the promise of reform, has had no choice but to yield to the clerical establishment. Having witnessed the continued arrests and jailings of his colleagues, an assassination attempt on Saeed Hajjarian (a member of Khatami's inner circle), the murders of prominent intellectuals, the repeated closures of reformist press dailies, and the frequent crackdowns on student protests, Khatami has been backed into a corner. Moreover, his authority as delineated in article 121 of the constitution to "safeguard the constitution, uphold the truth, distribute justice, protect the freedoms of individuals and the rights of the nation" has been neutralized. The conservative clerics, while granting the will of the people in the reformist elections of the president and parliament, continue to dominate the judiciary, the Council of Guardians, and the state-run agencies — leaving Khatami politically paralyzed. As correctly suggested by Abdo and Lyons, "the president's efforts to foster an independent press, promote religious tolerance and political pluralism, and introduce the rule of law and civil society have all failed because the underlying theological dispute over the nature of religious and political authority has yet to be resolved."

It is in this uncertain political environment that Abdo and Lyons were expelled for interviewing the jailed reform journalist Akbar Ganji. Amidst the internal pressures, the latter's blaring criticism proved to be too much for the Khatami camp to bear, leaving Abdo and Lyons as victims of the reformers' vulnerability within the Islamic system. In essence, Abdo and Lyons *were* guilty. They had exposed the fractured fault lines of the revolution not only on the conservative side, but also among the reformists. They had been invited in as guests of the

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reformers and then in gratitude had bitten the hand that fed them.

From this exposé, what becomes evident is that there will likely be no more revolutionary earthquakes in Iran. The impassioned demonstrations and student frustrations are aftershocks that, with time and perseverance, will eventually lead to a new political consensus and pluralist polity. What shape the future government will hold is uncertain. And Abdo and Lyons discuss only the Islamic democratic option, neglecting the entire debate around a secular democratic alternative. Evidently, though, this current "reform" movement is neither cohesive nor widespread enough to effect radical or immediate change. The reformist factions remain at odds over their disparate political visions. This is why Abdo and Lyons deem the opposition movement "embryonic."

Ultimately, however, there is no doubt that change will come for the Iranian people. As Abdo and Lyons have shown, even clerical opposition runs in tandem with the rigid nature of the regime. They have revealed that it is not only the average Iranian worker, *bazaari*, or student who struggles to survive in the midst of these theocratic contradictions, but also a clerical class that feels stifled by the hypocritical quality of the political system. It is this clerical opposition, the challenge from within, that poses the greatest threat. Hence the need for silence, the need to control the press, the need to contain the idealistic student groups, the need to maintain domestic unity as the American shadow ominously looms on the horizon. The conservatives in power can muffle this opposition only for so long. With time and increased momentum, the fault lines will continue to grow and, with them, so will the hope of achieving the dream of freedom.

Terrorism As War

By Parag Khanna

Walter Laqueur. *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century.* Continuum Books. 288 pages. $24.95

In the course of CNN's commercial-free week of coverage following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the network's dramatic banner changed from "America Under Attack" to "America's New War" to "War Against Terror." As it happens, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had already declared a "war against terrorism" in 1998. But only after 9-11 did terrorism graduate — permanently — from its status as an historical nuisance to that of one of the gravest dangers facing mankind. The all-encompassing transformation presently underway is underscored by post-September 11 rhetoric evoking

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comparisons to both the invisible, decades-old "war on drugs" and the massive national mobilization in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Terrorism, previously considered at most the continuation of war by other means, has become war itself.

Global wars of the past have been characterized by a restructuring of both the ordering among and the alliances between great powers; thus, it is too early to tell whether the current war on terror will meet these essential criteria to earn the "World War III" label already bestowed on it by *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman, or even "World War IV," as suggested by Eliot Cohen and James Woolsey. Yet it is beyond dispute that terrorism has acquired strategic dimensions to complement its established tactical logic. The specter of terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction has prompted the Bush administration to adopt a retribution principle that equates any such attack with a declaration of war, automatically provoking American military retaliation against even suspected terrorist groups and their state sponsors. Interestingly, substituting Iraq for "terrorist group" and preemption for "retribution" in the previous sentence gives us the administration's justification for the March invasion of Iraq; this highlights how technological empowerment has given terrorism a geopolitical status rivaling that of traditional inter-state warfare. Terrorism has even encroached on the realm of civil wars, which were thought to have displaced great power rivalry after the Cold War. The legitimization of the ongoing persecution and military aggression against Chechens by Russia and Uighurs by China as "wars against terrorism," for example, has obscured the political line between terrorism and internal conflict.

As his title *No End to War* suggests, Walter Laqueur recognizes that terrorism's rise has further blurred its differentiation from war. The subtitle, "Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century," alludes to his claim that even as traditional wars fade into normative obsolescence, terrorism will be with us "for as long as anyone can envision." The octogenarian Laqueur's capstone book should therefore serve as a valuable resource for scholars and policymakers seeking to understand terrorism's definitions, history, pivotal players, and psychology for years to come. Furthermore, in refining the arguments of his pre-September 11 book *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (Oxford University Press, 1999), *No End to War* cements Laqueur's status as the preeminent scholar of terrorism, both old and new.

State sponsorship of terrorism no longer serves as the most logical point of entry into an exploration of the terrorism-war dynamic. For Syria and Iran, financial support and military patronage of Hezbollah were the most effective means to fight a proxy war against Israel, forcing the Jewish state's withdrawal from the "security zone" in southern Lebanon. Accompanying the end of the Cold War, however, the globalization forces that have opened borders, societies, and access to information technology have also allowed "local conflicts to turn into a worldwide campaign," according to Laqueur; terrorism has gone truly glob-

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al, shedding its traditional dependency on state sponsors. Indeed, in an age of instant communications and illicit financing, groups like al Qaeda appear capable of carrying out their operations despite the loss of a home base such as Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Not only are there other failed states where rent is cheap, but advanced technology also permits terrorist groups to function as multinationals would during periodic disruptions. The current war on terrorism will determine to what extent threatening terrorist host countries with military retaliation will curb terrorist activity. As Jessica Stern recently argued in *Foreign Affairs* (July-August 2003), "al Qaeda's already decentralized organization has become more decentralized still," making it potentially more unpredictable and dangerous than ever before. Operationally, these organizations are loose networks, outmaneuvering traditional governmental hierarchies. It seems that the governments of Western nations seeking to eliminate the terrorist threat require far more cooperation from other states and regimes, particularly in the Middle East.

Terrorists' newfound power to assert themselves globally demands a more sophisticated understanding of terrorism itself. By and large, policymakers and opinion leaders continue to conflate Islamic fundamentalism with nihilistic radicalism, a tenuous equation on both the empirical and intellectual levels — especially considering that the only cult terrorist incident in recent memory was the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995, in which only 11 people were killed. In contrast, Laqueur has dared to ask what few in the American policy community seem to think is necessary: "How do terrorists view themselves?" This question opens the door to a long overdue and far more revealing analysis of the means-ends logic of groups like al Qaeda. After the American-led coalition defeated Iraq in 1991, advocates of *jihad* gained strength from condemning the American "occupation" of the Arabian Peninsula, home to Islam's holiest sites. Al Qaeda's operations since that time — in particular the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; the suicide attack on the USS *Cole* in Aden, Yemen in 2000; and the explosions in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia this May — appear commensurate with the jihadists' stated goal of ousting the "American crusader forces," as Osama bin Laden called them in his 1996 declaration of war. As former CIA director James Woolsey has written, "Al Qaeda has been at war with us for the better part of a decade. What's new is that we finally noticed."

Historically, declarations of war are meant to articulate the political purposes of the war, guide military operations, and set the boundaries for justified conduct. Even as such formal declarations have become a lost art in the West (the U.S. formally declared war on neither Serbia nor Iraq), bin Laden's declaration contains clear statements of motivation and strategy. Furthermore, al Qaeda's *Encyclopedia of Jihad* is as comprehensive as any military manual in its attention to battle organization, intelligence gathering, and other aspects of war fighting. To view the struggle against al Qaeda's global activities as a war in which "the frontiers of national security are everywhere," as Philip Zelikow has put it, is important if for no other reason than to avoid

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falling into the "clash of civilizations" trap. Those who conflate bin Laden's inflammatory, religious rhetoric with al Qaeda's true objectives succumb to the same fallacy as those who believe that "ancient ethnic hatreds," not the quest for political domination, drove Slobodan Milosevic's ruthless aggression in the former Yugoslavia. Against the backdrop of a supportive Arab media and inept or absent U.S. public diplomacy, bin Laden has opportunistically played to emotionally resonant themes such as "historical humiliation" by the crusaders and the plight of the Palestinians to acquire legitimacy and win recruits. But there is nothing otherworldly about al Qaeda, which uses Western technology to attack high-profile targets in order to fulfill its stated anti-American aims. And with the United Nations resolution in May conferring the status of "occupying powers" upon the United States and Britain in Iraq, al Qaeda is given further impetus to plot future strikes to evict the "colonial invaders."

In two very useful historical chapters, Laqueur explains the origins of Islamic terrorism and *jihad* through the lens of a genealogy of sects such as Saudi Wahhabism and groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter was inspired by Sayyid Qutb, one of a number of disenfranchised religious scholars who formed an extremist diaspora during Egypt's Nasserite era. The story is fascinating particularly because it places the now-familiar names Abdel Rahman, mastermind of 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's personal doctor and advisor, in the restless days of the formation of the Gama'a Islamiya through the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. During and after the Afghan war, hundreds of these so-called Arab Afghans — now also members of al Qaeda — spread to Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, and Pakistan to continue the global *jihad*. Laqueur reminds us, however, that for these groups the main enemy has always been what they view as the infidel: puppet regimes in Egypt and now also Saudi Arabia.

Laqueur is at his best when debunking numerous, unfortunately widespread myths about the causes and consequences of terrorism. Stagnation in the Arab world, for example, is not a sufficient explanation for Islamic terrorism in Chechnya, India, China, or Indonesia. Armed with illustrative cases from Switzerland to Sri Lanka, he also dispels the notion that only Islam glorifies suicide and martyrdom. For true Islamic radicals, moreover, the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have no bearing whatsoever on their continuation of terrorism. In most cases, these fundamentalists have a strategy rooted territorially and politically outside the Palestine conflict, even if a resolution there would remove some support for continued Islamic extremism. Most important, citing mounting examples of terrorists — even suicide bombers — being drawn from the middle and wealthy classes, Laqueur opens the door to the realization that the "war of ideas" has not been won. Terrorism can just as well be seen as the political tactic of the motivated bourgeois, pursuing their interests as and when they can afford to. Laqueur also shows no hesitation in skewering the media — which has turned terrorism into an "ism," yet in

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Europe in particular has now acquiesced to the terrorists' discomfort with the label — and indicting academia: "With all the calls for a peaceful solution of the present conflicts, there should have been the readiness to have a new and harder look at the beliefs and aims of those who had prepared and carried out the attacks." Few academics have demonstrated the willingness to confront the logic or validity of terrorists' motives, and hence none have gotten inside their heads as Laqueur has.

But for all his sagacious commentary, Laqueur has for almost three decades remained reluctant to confront the issue of defining terrorism, cautioning that contention over a definition can hinder the proper study of political violence and that terrorists, as if by definition, aim to violate international norms. But as terrorism shifts from a "weapon of the weak" to an excuse for the powerful, the strategic error of allowing America's preferred definition to be corrupted must be confronted. We have already entered a phase where self-satisfying definitions are useless, particularly as Islamic scholars have recently defined terrorism in such a way as to include American actions: "All acts of aggression committed by individuals, groups or states against human beings, including attacks on their religion, life, intellect or property." The lowering of the bar on defining terrorism opens a Pandora's box of rhetorical combat and normative chaos — precisely the opposite of the consensus America needs to gain international legitimacy for its actions as the war on terrorism continues in the years ahead.

For terrorism on the scale of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, defining terrorism as war is the only way to justify the spectrum of responses undertaken. After September 11, a congressional resolution authorized "all necessary and appropriate force" against those who had perpetrated the attacks but did not issue a declaration of war. In prosecuting "Operation Infinite Justice," the administration refused to bow to domestic and international pressure to grant its captives status as prisoners of war. Whatever the legal merits, this ad hoc response is not a tenable long-term solution. There need not be hesitation in formally prosecuting terrorism by non-state groups as crimes against humanity, as this in fact provides the necessary legal basis for their unfettered prosecution, obliging international compliance and cooperation. Such concerted international legal action has already been the basis for ending piracy. If the price of having undeniable legal justification for the pursuit of terrorists worldwide is treating them according to the Geneva Conventions, it is worth it.

It is a well-known fact that during the 1990s, noncombatant deaths in warfare far outnumbered military casualties, meaning the laws of war have been systematically violated by both state and non-state actors. A 1973 United Nations resolution stated that the struggle for self-determination was in full accordance with the principles of international law, thus legitimizing a great deal of terrorism worldwide. Terrorists, resenting the label, welcome any recognition as freedom fighters. Their hopes for "just terrorism," however, are betrayed by the disproportionate means they now wield. No matter how legitimate the ends, weapons of

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war and mass casualties cannot be viewed as serving the elevation of mankind.

The shift from a terrorism to a war paradigm is clearly more than a semantic distinction. Looking forward, the legal implications are being hotly debated. Looking backward, the policy consequences of an outdated view of terrorism become clear as analysts attempt to explain the intelligence failures surrounding September 11. Paul Pillar, a senior CIA counterterrorism analyst, contends in *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001) that terrorism "is not accurately represented by the metaphor of war." In the late 1990s, the United States continued to conceive of and prosecute terrorism as a crime rather than as a clear and present danger, underfunding counterterrorism efforts despite the dire warnings of the Hart-Rudman and Gilmore commissions.

But a shift in the understanding of *warfare* has now brought war closer to terrorism in a manner policymakers should have confronted long ago. In contrast to the traditional definition of war as "open, armed hostility between armies of states," two Chinese colonels authored a military treatise in 1999 on *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House), which "transcends all boundaries and limits . . . using all means, including armed force and non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests." The military analyst Martin van Creveld has written that "as war between states exits through one side of history's revolving door, low intensity conflict among different organizations will enter through the other." The historian John Keegan also responds to this updating of the traditional definition of war: "[T]he great work of disarming tribes, sects, warlords and criminals — a principal achievement of monarchs in the 17th century and empires in the 19th — threatens to need doing all over again. Not many military establishments possess the skills, equipment and cultural ruthlessness necessary for the task." What if a chance to take out a Saddam Hussein or an Osama bin Laden comes at the price of suicidal risk on the part of those who undertake the task?

After reading *No End to War*, no one will be surprised by either recurring terrorist attacks or high threat assessments. It is no coincidence that the scope of international terrorism has expanded with the increasing number of military interventions, themselves often described as postmodern warfare. In chapters on the "battlefields of the future," Laqueur points to a long list of potentially violent conflicts with terrorist elements from Algeria to Syria to Indonesia. Just as other scholars, notably Andrew Bacevich of Boston University, are asking whether a globally deployed military continues to serve America's interests or is in fact counterproductive, Laqueur's crisis predictions for numerous regions beg the question as to whether terrorist incidents will again serve as the casus belli for further interventions. The perils of both America's experience with and responses to terrorism in the twenty-first century are thus best captured by an aphorism from Leon Trotsky a century ago: "You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you."

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Present Arms

By Bruce Berkowitz

Dana Priest. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military.* W.W. Norton & Company. 429 pages. $26.95

In this engaging book, Dana Priest, a reporter for the *Washington Post,* explores how the American military unexpectedly came to play a lead role in making foreign policy during the Clinton administration. The Defense Department's commanders in chief — "cincs" in DOD jargon — essentially became prefects, representing American interests — and power — over vast regions of the globe.

To understand how this happened, one first must see the world through DOD eyes. The Defense Department divides the globe into areas of responsibility, or commands. Each is assigned to a four-star admiral or general who directs units assigned to his command from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Until last year, the Defense Department referred to these generals and admirals as "commanders in chief," or "cincs," pronounced like the kitchen fixture. In 2002 the Defense Department changed the title to "combatant commander" to avoid confusion with the president, who is commander in chief of the armed forces under the Constitution. Even so, writers and military personnel alike still often use the term "cincs" from force of habit, without meaning to refer to the old title. In effect, the acronym has taken on a life of its own

In covering the activities of several cincs, Priest provides a first-hand account of how U.S. armed services are dealing with the new kinds of threats the nation now faces. In the Cold War, U.S. forces could focus on a single, predictable adversary: the Soviet Union. The most likely conflict was predictable, too — a Red Army invasion of Western Europe, possibly leading to a nuclear exchange.

Not so today. Current threats may be less apocalyptic than the potential explosion of tens of thousands of megatons' worth of thermonuclear warheads, but they often seem more complex and harder to manage. Priest rides along with American troops supporting Colombia in its war against drug traffickers and in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. She describes the 1999 U.S. intervention aimed at stopping Serbian troops from ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. And she follows the U.S. operation to eliminate al Qaeda bases and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the September 11 terrorist attack.

The result is a highly readable account of how U.S. forces prepare for these new threats. Priest began writing her book in the middle of the Clinton administration and completed it a few months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One gets the feeling that Priest had to make major adjustments after George W. Bush won

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the November 2000 election. The story line probably would have followed a continuous stream if Al Gore had been the victor. Gore presumably would have kept two key features of the Clinton defense policy: a gradual approach to military transformation, and the use of military forces for "nation-building" — that is, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping operations, and generally showing the American flag in a region to promote free, democratic government.

Alas, when Bush won the presidency, Priest had a new element to incorporate. Bush had campaigned against the Clinton administration's predilection for nation-building; he and his advisors argued that U.S. forces had been overextended and were being wasted in irrelevant operations that made them less prepared for more important conflicts. Bush also believed that Clinton was indecisive when he did deploy the troops. Bush's future national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, gave an assessment in a speech at the GOP convention in August 2000. She described how Bush would serve as commander in chief:

> He recognizes that the magnificent men and women of America's armed forces are not a global police force. They are not the world's 911. They are the strongest shield and surest sword in the maintenance of peace. If the time ever comes to use military force, President George W. Bush will do so to win — because for him, victory is not a dirty word.

Rice's comment would take on a different resonance 407 days later, because it was precisely 9-11 that made everyone rethink how U.S. forces would be used. The September 11, 2001 terrorist strikes showed how terrorist organizations could use failed states like Afghanistan and unstable countries like Sudan, Somalia, and Pakistan as bases for their operations. After 9-11, Bush became the most aggressive nation-builder of all — even as the task became more challenging. The Bush administration was determined to fix these trouble spots — even if it meant using military forces in non-combat roles and even if it meant deploying them in prolonged campaigns.

THE POST OF CINC had originated in World War II, when American and British military planners organized their war against the Axis powers into regional campaigns. Each region — Europe, the Pacific, Southwest Asia, and so on — was assigned to a top-ranking flag officer responsible for fusing into a unified force both ground and naval units, and often units from several countries. The United States continued this approach into the Cold War.

The main role of a CINC was always to command, but war planning at the strategic level usually involves high-level diplomacy. Also, there are massive logistics requirements for operations on this scale — bases, transportation, contracting with locals for supplies, and so on. So inevitably CINCs (and their staffs, which can number in the thousands) find themselves running what are, in effect, regional programs for economic development and civil affairs.

These facts, combined with the end of the Cold War and U.S. domestic politics, gave CINCs a new role and stature

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in the 1990s. Most Americans turned away from foreign affairs after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Congress squeezed the State Department budget. Indeed, American foreign relations often seemed on autopilot during the decade — even as the world became more complex.

The CINCs filled the vacuum by default, since they were often the highest-ranking U.S. officials active regionally, and they had to keep preparing for military contingencies in any case. As Priest explains, "In a decade when Congress significantly slashed money for diplomacy, the CINCs' headquarters had grown to more than twice their Cold War sizes. With a combined budget of $380 million a year, their resources were lavish compared to the civilian agencies that by law and tradition were supposed to manage U.S. foreign relations." The CINCs had become, in effect, the most visible representatives of the United States in many parts of the world and the dispensers of American largess.

Priest devotes just over half of the book to her adventures accompanying U.S. forces in peacetime operations in Nigeria, Indonesia, and Colombia, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, and pressuring the Milosevic regime out of Kosovo. Her accounts offer some interesting vignettes of how American foreign policy evolved in this era. She describes, for example, how Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, head of Central Command in 1999, would often use his past relations with Pakistani officers to troubleshoot U.S. relations in the Asian subcontinent. The task was all the more dicey because Zinni had to avoid getting crosswise with his boss, Defense Secretary William Cohen, or overstepping his own legal authority. Priest reports Zinni saying, "You have to be radical, give the CINCs more authority. You have a lot of 'suits' [civilian officials] running around who wouldn't want to give CINCs political authority. But we already have it."

Priest's reporting is a great read, but one cannot help but wonder if all the access the general officers granted her occasionally left her blinded by the glint of four-star insignia. For example, $380 million may seem like an enormous amount of money, but in the Defense Department, it is almost chump change — it amounts to about one tenth of one percent of the entire Defense Department budget. The big bucks are in operations and acquisition, and moving these funds into a different direction was the harder task.

WHICH BRINGS us to the other major factor Priest had to accommodate after the 2000 election: Donald Rumsfeld and his policy of defense transformation. The Clinton administration and Cohen had deliberately taken an incremental, go-slow approach to modernizing the American military. Cohen was concerned about the cost and risky technologies that would accompany radical change. Besides, the political mantra in the late 1990s was "preserve the budget surplus," and that naturally limited the money available for any modernization plan.

Rumsfeld, by contrast, believed that U.S. forces had to make greater use of modern technology — in particular, information technology. Any other course would fritter away America's

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unique advantage over its rivals and would leave U.S. forces unprepared for new threats. Alas, many officers resisted change, and so most of the news coming out of the Pentagon during the first eight months of 2001 was about conflicts between the new secretary and the uniformed military. The Pentagon bureaucracy nickled and dimed the new secretary's plans. It is easy to forget today, but by the summer of 2001 many pundits were writing that Rumsfeld would not even survive until the next election.

In fact, squabbling between civilian officials and top officers is an old story, and generals and admirals had resisted the Clinton administration's policy of nation-building at least as vigorously as they resisted the Bush administration's new policy of defense transformation. It's tempting to say simply that military organizations are instinctively conservative, but there is more to it than that. There are incentives and culture at work, and it is important to understand these if one hopes to understand the challenge of preparing the U.S. military for the new era.

The origin of military organizations dates back 3,000 years, when the first recorded armies were established in ancient Persia. The Persians discovered that by fighting as a hierarchical, orderly group rather than as a mere rabble, soldiers could both concentrate their firepower and protect each other. Firearms and mechanization increased the speed and distance of warfare, but the basic features of an army have remained the same over time and from country to country: chain of command, formation deployment, and group maneuver.

This was why armies drilled. The military drill trained individual soldiers and smaller units to move and act as part of a larger unit and plan. Drilling and mustering an army into formation before battle was also good for motivation. Once the fighting began, any single soldier who strayed was apt to be picked off and killed (or shot as a deserter). Even after 3,000 years, this modus operandi — massing forces into a unified strike — is almost instinctive for army officers. As proof, consider Lieutenant General Fred Franks, Commander of VII Corps in Operation Desert Storm. Franks delayed attacking the Iraqi Republican Guard at a crucial stage of Desert Storm, when it was within easy striking distance of some of his forces. This, according to his critics, allowed the Guard to escape intact — and survive to fight 12 years later.

But, in reality, Franks was simply reflecting the conventional wisdom of an Army officer, which says a commander should wait until he can cock his forces and fire an all-out, synchronized strike into the enemy. As Franks told a *Frontline* interviewer five years after the war:

> I wanted to hit the Republican Guards with a three-division fist. I didn't want to poke at them with fingers — in other words, piecemeal commitment of my forces. I wanted to hit them with a fist at full speed.

When asked, "What happens to people who attack in fingers rather than fists?" Franks replied:

> What you get is, you get piecemeal commitment, you get lack of coherence in the attack or lack of syn-

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> chronization of fires with maneuver forces, with ground and air coordination, and what you get is you get a chance, a probability of increased casualties, you get the probability of an attack that starts and stops and starts and stops, loses momentum, and you get all those things that you really don't want.

Franks's outlook is typical among Army officers. Indeed, in 1991, he was promoted to the rank of full general and went on to command the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), holding the post through November 1994. In effect, this assignment validated his judgment in Desert Storm.

Throughout the 1980s, the so-called military reform movement challenged this view. These analysts and military thinkers argued that the traditional synchronization was too constraining. They argued for "maneuver warfare," emphasizing smaller, more agile units that could quickly seize opportunities on the battlefield as they appeared — even if that meant they would break out of a synchronized formation. The traditionalists and the reformers debated their ideas throughout the decade. Then, in the 1990s, cheap microprocessors and the internet settled the question.

With the new technology, almost anyone on the battlefield could trade data with anyone else. Today it is common for military commanders at all levels to communicate via tactical intranet chat rooms or to download imagery directly from servers. This communications technology, combined with the deadly combination of new sensors and precision-guided weapons, led to the idea of "network-centric" warfare, in which even small units — like special operations forces — could pack a lethal punch because they could pool data, locate their targets, and then direct fire from hundreds or even thousands of miles away.

Network-centric warfare was part of the transformation Rumsfeld and his advisors pushed. But many military officers — especially in the Army — refused to believe that the new technology was as miraculous as some claimed. This was understandable; they were the ones who were on the front line. For a platoon commander in Korea or planning to deploy to the Middle East, a Washington analyst promising that a microchip will make a soldier 10 times more capable sounded much like the Iranian mullahs who claimed that their prayer scarves would ward off Iraqi nerve gas attacks. Little wonder the traditionalists pushed back.

As Priest describes, however, Afghanistan vindicated this new form of combat (as did Operation Iraqi Freedom a year later.) Relatively small numbers of U.S. forces crushed their adversaries on the battlefield, suffering few casualties in the process. Alas, these tactics and even much of the technology is available to our adversaries as well — as al Qaeda and the Iraqi *fedayeen* have demonstrated in their own use of networked military operations.

YET THE complications in Iraq after the Baathist regime fell illustrated how victory on the battlefield is often only the start of a larger challenge, and this is where Priest connects the controversies over nation-building in the 1990s with the wars the United States fought

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in the following decade. It turned out that many of the skills the Clinton Pentagon hoped would avert conflict were the same ones the Bush Pentagon needed to secure victory.

It was easy to view the Clinton administration's efforts at nation-building as charity and, given some of the ideological leanings of the officials, they probably were. The early Clinton administration, remember, saw the Defense Department as a fount of technology development funding for "growing the economy." So critics could be forgiven if they thought nation-building was an effort to convert the Defense Department into a foreign-oriented Department of Health and Human Services.

Priest argues, though, that today such nation-building activities must be an integral part of military planning. Writing soon after the American liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban, she observes:

> Much of the ambivalence in foreign relations affecting Clinton's presidency reflected a larger angst among civilian and military leaders over the proper role of the military in peacetime. On the surface, it might appear as if this question has been settled. September 11 provided a sudden clarity of purpose for the U.S. military and its leaders. President Bush defined it as "good versus evil." I beg to differ.
>
> Although the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was clear in purpose, we are now seeing that the hardest, longest, and most important work comes after the bombing stops, when rebuilding replaces destroying, and consensus-building replaces precision strikes.

As we are discovering in Iraq today, nation-building will likely be "the operation that comes after the operation" — the process of ensuring law and order and a functioning government after we win a war. This is especially true given the nature of modern U.S. military operations. As John Peters has noted, unlike traditional warfare, which often devastates the opponent's society and destroys its army, modern warfare "in the American style" usually leaves the society and even much of the economy and even political structure intact.

If we expect to use our new forces effectively, we will need these new capabilities — rapidly deployable police forces with non-lethal weapons and effective plans for civil affairs and psychological operations, for example. In effect, defense transformation is turning the need for nation-building on its head. Nation-building is essential not just to avoid the fighting, but to secure the payoff when the war is over. Pick almost any future potential conflict — Iran, North Korea, West Africa — and you see the need. If the U.S. military cannot meet the requirement, one has to wonder: Who will?

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

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